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Re: Rock and a hard place



1.  I concur with Kellen & others that we MUST have a voter verifiable paper ballot.  The Diebold machine controversy in the Georgia governor election recently should amply exemplify the problem of not being able to truly verify a contested close election.    (Reference,for example, which you've probably already seen:  http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,60563,00.html   )   
As mentioned earlier, some machines, such as Hart Interactive, can provide a printed receipt of each voter's ballot, which the voter can verify thru a window, (where a 2D barcode code also be added adjacent to the ballot receipt). This might be quite sufficient.
 
2.  If we go with scanners (or DRE), then there must be guarantees by the manufacturer that the machine can handle all main types of future applications, such as Ranked Voting, for an agreed-upon & affordable price, where it could be installed in the future.  Thus the scanners would have to produce a digital Ballot Image of each voter's record, I believe. 
 
3.  Can these Scanners give warning about under-votes and prevent over-votes?
 
Thanks for letting me contribute,    JCBollinger
 ----- Original Message -----
Sent: Friday, October 17, 2003 1:07 PM
Subject: RE: Rock and a hard place

Tom,
 
Thanks for correcting my error.
 
How do you (or anyone) respond to the substance of my suggestion (below)? 
 
That is, Boulder County could buy an optical scanning device (or other appropriate ballot tabulating machine) capable of tabulating both hand-marked absentee ballots and hand-marked (or machine-marked) ballots. 
 
Then, if and when the computer security industry agrees on specs and technical standards, sometime down the road, BC takes it from there.  NIST, at HAVA request, has barely begun to address this complex issue.
 
I've read too many articles, including the Guardian article earlier this week, to feel remotely comfortable approving any system not based on a voter verifiable paper ballot.  No independent recount, it's not a fair election, period.
 
The core issue with these electronic voting systems is security, but the Committee isn't competent to judge that issue.
 
Finally, what are all various voting system options open to Boulder County?  Is there a study that lists the various options and their advantages and disadvantages?  If there isn't shouldn't there be one, if not by Boulder County then by the State, or some other competent authority?
 
Is the choice limited to these four electronic voting vendors?  Is the scenario I parrot from Kolwicz and others an option?  If not, why not?
 
Thanks.
 
kell

"Halicki, Tom" <thalicki@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
Kell:
Boulder County does not have an optical scan system.  The punch card system used card readers to tally votes.  

  -----Original Message-----
From: kellen carey [mailto:kcarey636@xxxxxxxxx]
Sent: Thursday, October 16, 2003 11:42 AM
To: Alan; Boulder Computer Voting
Subject: Re: Rock and a hard place

Alan,
 
This is a complicated subject.  Few people are informed well enough to make a decision.  There are a whole range of intertwined electoral and technical issues, and the more a I read/learn, the more layers of complexity I see.
 
I suggest we be cautious.
 
Therefore, I suggest for Boulder County what Al Kolwicz of CAMBER is suggesting:
 
1. In the short term (i.e. 2004, possibly 2005), we should opt for hand-marked paper ballots, preferably identical to the absentee mailed ballots, all read by the same optical scanning devices Boulder County already owns and has been using for years.
 
2. That buys some time to acquire in the future computer/voter interface machines (whether touchscreen or other) capable of multiple ballots, multiple languages, second chance voting, a voter verifiable paper ballot, and audio capability for the one ADA-compliant machine mandated per precinct by HAVA.
 
3. There should be NO digital balloting at all unlessl all technical security and privacy issues have been thoroughly hashed out to the satisfaction of a whole range of independent testers and experts.  Establishing the specifications, testing, reviews, etc., will almost certainly take several years.
 
kell 

Alan <Alan@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
Ok, for everyone that attended the meetings in Boulder regarding the
Electronic Voting machines currently being considered for Boulder county
(and for others that are generally informed on the subject), what is your
favorite system?

I personally feel that some of the sales people were bold face lying in
their presentations and some were deliberately misleading in their answers
to certain questions. There are to many security concerns and proprietary
software issues with any of the systems. This decision is like which flavor
of mud do you like best. If I were to choose today I believe I would still
go with Advante due to their embracing the voter verifiable paper ballot.

In many ways I am suspicious of the whole effort to use DRE's in the voting
process. I personally feel that we should mark a paper ballot and then
place it in the "v! ote reader" scanner. When the display verifies that the
ballot scan reflects the voters intentions then the ballot is transfer to
the ballot box. That way we have a check and balances system and paper
ballots for a recount.

What are your thoughts.

Alan


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