statement for lobbying congress [Re: Rep. Udall town meetings 11/8...]

[Neal McBurnett <neal@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

Doug and I were at the Broomfield meeting.  There were lots of hands
up and Udall didn't call on me, but we talked briefly with his staff
(forgot to ask who....) and handed him a copy of the CVV statement and
an encourgement to cosponsor HR 2239.

Again, Udall's number is 202-225-2161 or 303-650-7820.

Below is the statement I planned to read.  I also propose it as
a statement for endorsement by the group.

To that end I've also put it up at
 http://bcv.booyaka.com/moin.cgi/VoterConfidenceActStatement and
put a temporary  link to it from
 http://bcv.booyaka.com/moin.cgi/OtherResourcesToBeIntegrated

If we like it, or an edited version, (according to whatever process
people want to follow), perhaps someone else could remove the "under
consideration" language from the statement there, and move the link to
the home page.

Cheers,

Neal McBurnett                 http://bcn.boulder.co.us/~neal/
Signed and/or sealed mail encouraged.  GPG/PGP Keyid: 2C9EBA60


The right to vote is our most sacred and fundamental right as US
citizens.  I'd like to urge you to support HR 2239, the Voter
Confidence and Increased Accessibility Act.

We are alarmed at the way that states and counties around the nation
are being forced by Congress to rush into the use of risky new
technology to count our votes.  The rush is due to deadlines in the
Help America Vote Act (HAVA).

Unfortunately, the Congress has not yet even appointed members to the
HAVA Election Assistance Commission.  And the National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST), which is responsible under HAVA for
helping set standards for voting equipment, hasn't even had their
first public meeting on the topic.  No standards based on any federal
recommendations will be in place before the 2004 national elections,
yet the Congress requires Boulder County and others to get new
machines before then.  This is highly irresponsible.  The deadlines
and funding incentives must be extended.

HAVA is also misguided in encouraging the elimination of paper
ballots.  Computerized voting equipment is inherently subject to
programming error, equipment malfunction, and malicious tampering. It
is therefore crucial that voting equipment provide a voter-verifiable
paper ballot - a permanent record of each vote that can be checked for
accuracy by the voter before the vote is submitted, is difficult or
impossible to alter after it has been checked, and can be recounted
when necessary.

Furthermore, current voting machines have been shown to be deeply
flawed and insecure in studies by Johns Hopkins University faculty, by
contractors for the State of Maryland, and by others.  The existing
software code inspections did not catch these serious problems.  There
is evidence that the companies making the machines have not followed
the legal requirements, and have political biases.  In order for
voters to have confidence in the system, the software for voting
machines must be fully disclosed to election officials, researchers,
political parties, and anyone who may question their validity and
security.  In Australia the Evacs voting system, first used in 2001,
is based completely on publicly disclosed softare, and enables
citizens with various disabilities to cast their vote privately.

HR 2239, the Voter Confidence Act, extends deadlines and funding,
requires a paper trail, bans the use of undisclosed software, and .
requires mandatory surprise recounts in 0.5% of jurisdictions?  Will
you co-sponsor it, strengthen it, and work hard to make it law?