Daily Camera: Let's HAVA closer look

["Paul Tiger" <tigerp@xxxxxxxxxxxx>]

The Daily Camera

Let's HAVA closer look
State, county should slow the rush to e-voting

December 7, 2003

Given still-festering suspicions about the accuracy of the 2000 presidential
election, it's not surprising that concern about newfangled, electronic
voting systems has grown from a gradual swell to a wave that seems on the
verge of cresting.

After the Florida debacle, Congress passed the Help America Vote Act in an
effort to stave off doubts about the credibility of elections. Under HAVA,
states must replace old "punch card" systems in time for the November 2004
elections, or they will not receive their share of $3.9 billion to help pay
for new machines.

And so companies peddling hi-tech voting systems have been wooing county
clerks across the nation. Their offerings fall mostly into two categories:
Direct Recording Electronic systems, which record the vote directly to
software (often via "touch screens"), and optical-scan systems, which read
and record votes made on hard-copy ballots.

Not surprisingly, the hawkers have dangled HAVA deadlines before nervous
elections officials in pressuring them to buy their systems.

Boulder County, after a months-long public process, is poised to choose a
new system on Dec. 12. We don't know what the recommendation will be, but
there are too many questions regarding the security of the new technology to
make this all-important decision just yet.

What potential problems exist? Many computer experts - no Luddites, they -
say DRE systems are vulnerable to mischief that cannot be detected by anyone
but a highly trained technician. Worse, most of the companies pitching the
systems claim that their software is proprietary, which means that even the
savviest independent computer guru might not be able to ferret out flaws or
tampering. In fact, in elections where DREs have been used - 2002 elections
for governor and U.S. senator in Georgia, for example - results wildly at
odds with scientific polls already have raised eyebrows.

And given that the HAVA-mandated Election Assistance Commission, which is
supposed to set standards, hasn't even been formed yet, Boulder County would
be wise to wait - if possible - before spending millions of dollars on a new
system.

A local group of computer experts and others, Citizens for Verifiable
Voting, argues that touch-screen machines would be acceptable only if the
official vote is not embedded in software, but recorded on a "paper ballot"
that could be electronically tallied, but also examined if questions arose.
They prefer optical-scan systems to DREs, and say any system must not be
based on "secret" computer code. All three county commissioners - who will
have the final say - seem to share their concerns.

Supporters of new technology dismiss all doubts as good, old-fashioned fear
of the new. They argue that administrative security is the answer, and
clerks seem almost wounded that anyone would doubt their ability to
safeguard the vote.

They frequently point out that DREs help disabled voters and non-English
speakers. And, of course, clerks under heavy pressure to produce quick
results simply like streamlined e-voting: There's less hassle, and it's
fast.

That's all well and good. But all the convenience for clerks and speed in
the world is not worth undermining the credibility of elections - the
supposed goal of HAVA. As one local computer expert sagely asked, "Why give
the conspiracy theorists a field in which to play?"

HAVA allows states to receive a waiver of an upcoming Jan. 1, 2004 deadline,
and indications are that Colorado Secretary of State Donetta Davidson will
apply. That would be a good first step. From there, Boulder County could -
and should - take more time to consider how to give voters maximum
confidence in our elections.