Bev Harris/BBV Press Kit

[tom bldr <tom_bldr@xxxxxxxxx>]

I didn't see this "press kit" PDF conspicuously at the BBV homepage, rather I noticed someone pointed to it at a blog.

http://www.blackboxvoting.com/bbv/1216presskit.pdf  TEXT FOLLOWS, please disseminate to media outlets!  -Tom Rategan

snip

Contact: Bev Harris 425-228-7131 Bevharriscontact@xxxxxxx

Or Andy Stephenson 206-778-0524 stephenson_for_sos@xxxxxxxxx

Bev Harris, author of Black Box Voting, and Andy Stephenson, Democratic candidate for

Washington Secretary of State, have uncovered information that brings concerns about electronic

voting to a new level. This information affects both optical scans and touch-screens; it also affects

the security of absentee ballots.

What we have, in Washington State, is this:

We?ve got the state election director misstating when versions were certified, somebody at the

secretary of state?s office signing off on software with no NASED number, and when we try to

find out what software is actually authorized, we get the buffalo shuffle. We?ve got a convicted

drug dealer printing our ballots, a 23-count embezzler programming our voting system, and our

absentee ballots are being funneled through a private company that hires mainly immigrants but

also people straight out of prison.

We?ve now documented 10 states that are using unauthorized software, and internal memos

that indicate that five Diebold programmers uploaded these unauthorized programs, knowing that

this was not allowed.

Voter Security Concerns

Diebold left 40,000 files on an unprotected FTP Web site. On this site, they left their own

software, but also left software belonging to other companies. Also sitting on that Web site was

the private information for 310,000 Texans.

Distributing voter registration ?walking lists,? especially on the Internet, creates significant

security risks. Identity thieves can work anonymously from anywhere in the world and, armed

with your social security number and a few other details, can quite literally ruin your life. And all

they need is your name, address and birthday to get your Social Security number.

Voter registration information can be misused by:

? Identity thieves

? Stalkers

? Child molestors

People have a right to privacy, even in the Internet age. Any woman who has an abusive exboyfriend

will tell you that she doesn't want her apartment number published on an open web site.

Child custody cases can get nasty.

Voter registration files typically contain birthdays. First, middle and last names. Street

addresses. Apartment numbers. School districts. Political affiliations. Voting habits.

As we rethink public policy to bring it up to date with new computerized voting methods, we

need to create public policy to prevent people who are patriotic and want to vote from having

their personal security jeopardized. We also need to prohibit making these databases available for

purchase unless they are privacy protected.

Sources to call:

Bev Harris - 425-228-7131 Bevharriscontact@xxxxxxx

Andy Stephenson - 206-778-0524 - stephenson_for_sos@xxxxxxxxx

Expert on Identity Theft: Johnny May 248-745-0286 E-mail: SECRES@xxxxxxxxxxx

Contact: Bev Harris 425-228-7131 Bevharriscontact@xxxxxxx

Or Andy Stephenson 206-778-0524 stephenson_for_sos@xxxxxxxxx

Security of Absentee Ballots

Perhaps like most people, you believe that your absentee ballot goes from the elections office

through the U.S. Post Office to you. After you cast your votes, you then send it through the U.S.

Post Office to the elections division.

Not quite. There is a middleman, and apparently no regulations, criminal background checks,

or auditing procedures apply to the middleman.

King County has been subcontracting out the processing for its 500,000 absentee ballots to

Diebold Election Systems, who then subcontracts to PSI Group, Inc., a private for-profit company

based in Omaha, Nebraska.

According to the ?community release plan? obtained for two felons, Jeffrey W. Dean and John

L. Elder, this absentee ballot sorting firm, PSI Group Inc., had agreed to hire them upon leaving

prison, after they served time for embezzlement and drug dealing, respectively.

There are two ways to manipulate absentee election results if an unscrupulous person gains

access to the mail sorting process:

? Vote suppression ? Lose outgoing ballots to a portion of voters in key precincts, forcing

them to call and ask for a replacement ballot.

? Vote reduction ? Lose or replace incoming ballots for a portion of voters in key precincts.

PSI Group Inc. initially sorted just outgoing ballots, but now also sorts the incoming ballots.

PSI Group employees have access to the most high-risk attack point for absentee ballot security.

Though King County may claim that it employs an audit method, counting the ballots received

before they go out to PSI Group, in fact they are unable to do this consistently. Indeed, it would

make no sense to sort them into precincts and count them and then contract with someone else to

sort them. Also, on some days up to 60,000 ballots at a time arrive, and King County is not

staffed to do this. Therefore ? any ballots that disappear will have no audit trail.

We need some procedural safeguards:

1. Criminal background checks on anyone sorting absentee ballots, either outgoing or

incoming

2. Tighter audit procedures designed to deter absentee ballot fraud.

Contact numbers:

Bev Harris - 425-228-7131 Bevharriscontact@xxxxxxx

Andy Stephenson - 206-778-0524 - stephenson_for_sos@xxxxxxxxx

King County Elections Office - Dean Logan - 206-296-1540

.

Use of unauthorized voting programs

While the certified version of the voting software sits in escrow at the secretary of state?s

office, unauthorized versions have been installed on our voting systems in four Washington State

counties and in locations in California, Arizona, New Mexico, Kentucky, Kansas, Maryland,

Florida, Colorado and Georgia.

Diebold programmers in Vancouver have been writing the software, uploading it to the FTP

site and, from there, election officials and Diebold field techs have been downloading and

installing it, overwriting the approved software.

You can determine whether the authorized version is being used by comparing the NASED

version number to the version number installed on the voting system. After looking at every ITAtested

NASED authorized version number available, there can be no other conclusion: Diebold

has been putting unauthorized software into our voting systems.

When Georgia Secretary of State Cathy Cox says, of ballot-tampering, ?It would take a

conspiracy beyond belief, of all these different poll workers ? I don?t see how this could happen

in the real world,? she?s dead wrong. It doesn?t take a conspiracy beyond belief. It takes one

person, working alone at the office at night.

* * * * *

The Diebold Memos made their first public appearance on BlackBoxVoting.org when 24

internal Diebold memos with a commentary about use of unapproved software appeared on

BlackBoxVoting.org. Everyone yawned except Diebold, who hit BlackBoxVoting.org with a

cease and desist.

You might be yawning now.

Boring. Mundane. Someone used 1.18.4 instead of 1.17.23. Ho hum.

Except for this: A programmer never changes a version number unless he changes the

underlying computer code. If the versions are never submitted for certification, only the single

individual who programmed the change knows for sure what he put in there.

?Maybe they?ll say it was just to fix bugs,? one reporter suggested. Sure. They?ll say that. And

they?ll say it was just to add features and just to create a new report format. And that might all be

true, but before you breathe a sigh of relief, let me give you a taste of just how out of control this

problem has been.

Two of the five programmers who put uncertified software on the Diebold FTP site ? Talbot

Iredale and Guy Lancaster ? were hired during the ?Vancouver Maneuver? era, while the

company was managed and promoted by a money launderer and an individual who had gone to

jail for defrauding the Canadian government. We know little about Iredale and Lancaster and

nothing about the other three programmers.

Through the HAVA Act, we?re investing four billion dollars in voting machines, and

certification is the foundation of the structure. Remove it, and the whole house of cards tumbles.

* * * * *

?As far as we know, some guy from Russia could be controlling the outcome of computerized

elections in the United States,? Lynn Landes wrote.

Lynn, meet Dmitry Papushin, some guy from Russia. He is one of the five Diebold

programmers who has been putting programs on the FTP site. Take a look at his memos. What

he?s doing here is placing uncertified software versions on a Web site, and people are using it.

Underlines represent versions that were never certified, or the implementation of poor security

procedures.

18 Jan 2000 memo from Dmitry Papushin: ?GEMS 1-14-5 is ready. The password is: ik12lld2n4mpd.?

January 25, 2000 memo from Steve Knecht: ?Will all future 1.14x versions be compatible with 1.14.5 if we

burn mem cards in San Luis Obispo now??

15 January 2003 memo from Dmitry Papushin: ?Ballot Station 4-3-14 for Windows CE and Windows NT are

ready.?

10 February 2003 memo from Cathy Smothers: ?Can anyone send me the BS CE 4.3.14 .ins file? I have a

demo tomorrow morning and I need this to upgrade the TS units ...?