[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]

Re: Dual DRE/paper system



But, as noted here a few weeks ago, well-known cryptography expert
David Chaum has indeed claimed to have solved this problem in a
somewhat related way via cryptic receipts and later on-line
verification, but without disclosing how the votes were actually cast.

 http://www.vreceipt.com/

I don't know if it has been independently verified by well-qualified
researchers.

I think it is complicated enough that many voters won't be convinced,
so it won't result in as much extra voter confidence as paper ballots.
There are some procedural aspects that may lead to frustration.

One significant drawback is that it will probably be patented, which
will slow the acceptance and raise the price.

But it does have a number of advantages.

Neal McBurnett                 http://bcn.boulder.co.us/~neal/
Signed and/or sealed mail encouraged.  GPG/PGP Keyid: 2C9EBA60

On Wed, Dec 24, 2003 at 06:24:20PM -0700, Neal McBurnett wrote:
> This ends up allowing the user to prove who and what they voted for.
> They could bring the receipt to someone as proof of how they voted.
> It thus violates the principle that the system must not facilitate
> vote buying.  I don't know of many people who are willing to give up
> on that.  We got away from it in the late 1800's - good riddance!
> 
> Neal McBurnett                 http://bcn.boulder.co.us/~neal/
> Signed and/or sealed mail encouraged.  GPG/PGP Keyid: 2C9EBA60
> 
> On Wed, Dec 24, 2003 at 01:49:11PM -0700, Nicholas Bernstein wrote:
> > I have finished the first version of my "white paper" on my proposed 
> > dual DRE/paper system. Please check it out.
> > 
> >  http://osl-www.colorado.edu/~bernsten/dualvoting.html
> > 
> > I look forward to your comments.
> > 
> > Nick