RE: Help needed today.

["AlKolwicz" <AlKolwicz@xxxxxxxxx>]

Evan

Oh, I see what you're referring to.  I've clipped both sections below.

The part you're referring to is 1-10.5-102(3) .... 

	"If the results of the machine count and the hand count are
identical, then the recount shall be conducted in the same manner as the
original ballot count."

You've got a good point.

In my CAMBER testimony, I intend to focus on the need for voters to verify
their votes and the need for the paper ballot.

I don't think it would hurt for you to bring up your point -- with which I
agree.

My sense is that we MUST get the digital ballot quashed and the paper ballot
adopted.  If we fail to do so now, more equipment will be purchased and our
likelihood of success in the future is lessened.

If we fail to fix the recount language, I think that we can get it repaired
later.  If we fail to eliminate "paper audit trails" this year, we'll be
stuck with non-trustworthy elections for a long long time.

Al





========================

1-10.5-102. Recounts for congressional, state, and district offices, state
ballot questions, and state ballot issues.

Statute text
(1) If the secretary of state determines that a recount is required for the
office of United States senator, representative in congress, any state
office or district office of state concern, any state ballot question, or
any state ballot issue certified for the ballot by the secretary of state,
the secretary of state shall order a complete recount of all the votes cast
for that office, state ballot question, or state ballot issue no later than
the twenty-fifth day after the election.

(2) The secretary of state shall notify the county clerk and recorder of
each county involved by registered mail and facsimile transmission of a
public recount to be conducted in the county at a place prescribed by the
secretary of state. The recount shall be completed no later than the
fortieth day after any election. The secretary of state shall promulgate and
provide each county clerk and recorder with the necessary rules and
regulations to conduct the recount in a fair, impartial, and uniform manner,
including provisions for watchers during the recount. Any rule or regulation
concerning the conduct of a recount shall take into account the type of
voting system and equipment used by the county in which the recount is to be
conducted.

(3) Prior to any recount, the canvass board shall choose a precinct at
random and a test number of ballots on which to conduct a machine count and
hand count of ballots. The precinct chosen shall have at least fifty ballots
for the count. If the results of the machine count and the hand count are
identical, then the recount shall be conducted in the same manner as the
original ballot count.

===

1-10.5-108. Method of recount.
Statute text
(1) The recount shall be of the ballots cast, and the votes shall be
recorded on sheets other than those used at the election.

(2) Unless otherwise directed by the secretary of state, the ballots cast
shall be recounted utilizing the same procedures, methods, and processes
that were utilized for the original count of the ballots cast.

====



-----Original Message-----
From: AlKolwicz [mailto:AlKolwicz@xxxxxxxxx] 
Sent: Wednesday, February 11, 2004 1:11 PM
To: 'Evan Daniel Ravitz'
Cc: cvv-discuss@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Subject: RE: Help needed today.

Hi Evan,

Please point me to where you are referring.

Thanks

al

-----Original Message-----
From: Evan Daniel Ravitz [mailto:evan@xxxxxxxx] 
Sent: Wednesday, February 11, 2004 11:12 AM
To: AlKolwicz
Cc: cvv-discuss@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Subject: Re: Help needed today.


I cannot support Al's proposed changes as long as the bill continues
to mandate electronic recounts for congressional, state and district
elections, merely adding another meaningless "test" of the proprietary
software.

We need to ask that section 1-10.5-102 be identical to 1-10.5-108 (as
re-written in HB 1296) or be merged into one.

Evan

On Tue, 10 Feb 2004, AlKolwicz wrote:

> From: AlKolwicz [mailto:AlKolwicz@xxxxxxxxx]
> Sent: Tuesday, February 10, 2004 10:43 AM
> To: CAMBER
> Subject: Will you please help?
>
>
>
> HB 1296 will be heard by the State, Veterans, and Military Affairs
committee
> this Thursday afternoon.
>
>
>
> It is very important that this bill be amended or defeated.  It is posted
at
>
http://www.leg.state.co.us/CLICS2004A/csl.nsf/fsbillcont3/2B1087A3259B4C8287
> 256DF8005CBB75?Open
>
<http://www.leg.state.co.us/CLICS2004A/csl.nsf/fsbillcont3/2B1087A3259B4C828
> 7256DF8005CBB75?Open&file=1296_01.pdf> &file=1296_01.pdf
>
>
>
> As written, the bill would legitimize digital ballots which cannot be
> verified by the voter.  It would also legitimize more than one ballot per
> voter - a digital ballot and a paper document (something like a cash
> register receipt).  This is not acceptable.
>
>
>
> Please contact the committee members and let them know that the public
> insists on one ballot per voter and it must be a paper ballot that is
> verified by the voter.
>
>
>
> We have submitted the following recommended changes to the bill.
>
>
>
> 1.	From the third sentence of the bill summary delete, "for purposes of
> any recount"
>
>
>
> 2.	1-1-104 (23.8) "PERMANENT PAPER RECORD" MEANS THE PAPER BALLOT
> CONTAINING THE FULL-BALLOT-TEXT AND THE VOTES (MARKS) MADE BY THE VOTER,
OR
> CAUSED TO BE MADE BY THE VOTER, AND WHICH PAPER BALLOT WAS VERIFIED BY THE
> VOTER AFTER THE MARKS WERE MADE AND BEFORE THE BALLOT WAS CAST BY THE
VOTER.
> ABSENTEE AND IN-PERSON BALLOTS FOR THE SAME JURISDICTION MUST HAVE THE
SAME
> APPEARANCE SO THEY CAN BE COUNTED USING THE SAME PROCESS/EQUIPMENT.
>
>
>
> 3.	1-7-118 (3) delete the last words, "FOR PURPOSES OF ANY RECOUNT"
>
>
>
> Please call and leave a short message, including your phone number, and
> write a brief e-mail to:
>
>
>
>
> Representative
>
>
>
> County
>
> 303-866-Extension
>
> e-mail
>
> State, Veterans, and Military Affairs
>
>
> Frangas, K.Jerry
>
> D
>
> Denver
>
> 2954
>
> kjerryfrangas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
>
> X
>
>
> Lundberg, Kevin
>
> R
>
> Larimer-Weld
>
> 2907
>
> kevin@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> <mailto:kevin@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx@mac.com>
> KevinLundberg@xxxxxxx
>
> X
>
>
> Mitchell, Shawn
>
> R
>
> Adams-Boulder-Broomfield-Weld
>
> 4667
>
> shawnmitch@xxxxxxx
>
> X
>
>
> Ragsdale, Ann F
>
> D
>
> Adams
>
> 2843
>
> ann.ragsdale.house@xxxxxxxxxxx
>
> X
>
>
> Schultheis, David
>
> R
>
> El Paso
>
> 2937
>
> dave.schultheis.house@xxxxxxxxxxx
> <mailto:dave.schultheis.house@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx@DaveSchultheis.com>
> Dave@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
>
> X
>
>
> Weddig, Frank
>
> D
>
> Arapahoe
>
> 2942
>
> frankweddig@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
>
> X
>
>
> Weissmann, Paul
>
> D
>
> Boulder
>
> 2920
>
> reppaul@xxxxxxx
>
> X
>
>
> Cadman, Bill
>
> R
>
> El Paso
>
> 5525
>
> bill.cadman.house@xxxxxxxxxxx
>
> X  Vchair
>
>
> Sinclair, William D "Bill"
>
> R
>
> El Paso
>
> 2965
>
> bill.sinclair.house@xxxxxxxxxxx
>
> X Chair
>
>
>
>
>
>   _____
>
> From: AlKolwicz [mailto:AlKolwicz@xxxxxxxxx]
> Sent: Monday, February 09, 2004 9:13 PM
> To: 'Dave@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx'
> Subject: HB 1296-voter verifiable paper record
>
>
>
> Rep. Schultheis,
>
>
>
> Hope everything is going well for you this session.  On Thursday, HB 1296
is
> scheduled to be heard by the State, Veterans, and Military Affairs
> committee.  We have studied this bill and plan to testify.
>
>
>
> Unless amended, HB 1296 has major problems and should not be passed.  It
> would legalize practices that would compromise elections and the public's
> trust in election results.
>
>
>
> However, the current bill can and should be amended to move Colorado
closer
> to secure, reliable and verifiable elections.
>
>
>
> Several of us met today with Rep. Madden, and in my opinion she appeared
> open to the following changes if they can help obtain passage of the bill.
> Roughly, the changes would be as follows:
>
>
>
> 1.	From the third sentence of the bill summary DELETE, "for purposes of
> any recount"
>
>
>
> 2.	REPLACE  1-1-104 (23.8) "PERMANENT PAPER RECORD" MEANS THE PAPER
> BALLOT CONTAINING THE FULL-BALLOT-TEXT AND THE VOTES (MARKS) MADE BY THE
> VOTER, OR CAUSED TO BE MADE BY THE VOTER, AND WHICH PAPER BALLOT WAS
> VERIFIED BY THE VOTER AFTER THE MARKS WERE MADE AND BEFORE THE BALLOT WAS
> CAST BY THE VOTER.  ABSENTEE AND IN-PERSON BALLOTS FOR THE SAME
JURISDICTION
> MUST HAVE THE SAME APPEARANCE SO THEY CAN BE COUNTED USING THE SAME
> PROCESS/EQUIPMENT.
>
>
>
> 3.	1-7-118 (3) DELETE the last words, "FOR PURPOSES OF ANY RECOUNT"
>
>
>
> The significance of these changes is described below.  In our opinion,
with
> these changes this bill should be passed; without these changes this bill
> should be defeated.
>
>
>
> We expect the vendors and the Secretary of State to oppose these changes;
> they already oppose the bill as written.  Their priority seems to be
> convenience to vendors and election officials.
>
>
>
> The public relies on the law to protect the interests of the public.  As
> drafted, the bill would place the interests of the public at risk.  That's
> why we recommend the 3 changes.
>
>
>
> I hope that you will support these changes.  If they are adopted, I hope
> you'll work to pass the bill.  If they are not adopted, we hope that
you'll
> work to defeat the bill.
>
>
>
> Please let me know if there is anything I can do to help.
>
>
>
>
>
> Al
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> Significance of recommended changes to HB 1296
>
>
>
> The recommended changes are intended to make clear that there is only one
> ballot, the paper ballot that contains the full-ballot-text; it must be
> verified by the voter before it is cast, and it is the only record used
for
> counting and for recounting.
>
>
>
> The current language would permit both a digital ballot, which is not
> verifiable by the voter, and a second record which appears intended to
> present voters with the impression that they are verifying their digital
> ballot (which they are not).  The second record could take any form such
as
> marks on a grid with no ballot text, or abstracts of votes (one line per
> race).  Neither of these is easily verifiable by the voter.  Also, the
> current language would permit media such as roll feed paper (similar to
cash
> register receipts) which are not useful for recounting, and would permit
> paper records that don't look the same as an absentee ballot for the same
> races in the same jurisdiction.
>
>
>
> Because votes are necessarily anonymous, only the voter can verify that
> their votes are recorded correctly.  Nobody else can do this.  Also,
nobody
> has demonstrated a trustworthy way for a voter to verify that their votes
> are recorded correctly when they are recorded on a digital memory.  Even
if
> it were possible, there is currently no voting system that guarantees the
> integrity of digital ballots after they are initially recorded.
Therefore,
> as of today only a paper ballot meets the public's requirements for
> verifiability and security.
>
>
>
> Finally, the slips of paper would not be ballots unless there is a
recount.
> This is not satisfactory.  High recount costs, compensating errors, and
> clever manipulation to avoid statutory recounts suggest that these slips
of
> paper come would nearly never be used for recounting.  Therefore, under
this
> bill, election outcomes would be determined by digital ballots that were
not
> verified by the voter.
>
>
>
> NOTE-1:  As you know, Colorado's current paper ballot system includes: (1)
a
> uniquely identified (2) removable ballot stub, (3) administrative
> responsibilities for controlling the whereabouts of every single ballot,
and
> (4) a system of laws and procedures that prescribe mandatory records -
such
> as poll books.  This system provides campaigns, voters and officials with
a
> way to track electors who did and did not vote, and ballots that are and
are
> not cast.  It enables canvass board members to "balance" the election.
> Within the limits of human knowledge, it guarantees that each eligible
> elector is given the opportunity to vote once and only once.  DRE voting
> machines do not provide these protections.
>
>
>
> NOTE-2:  There is at least one vendor of voting equipment that has a
product
> that scans a pre-printed un-voted paper ballot, provides the voter with a
> way to make voting selection, and prints the voter's choices onto their
> paper ballot.  This system warns of under votes, prevents over votes,
almost
> eliminates legibility problems, and meets the needs of disabled voters to
> vote in private.  Once the votes are printed, the voter may re-insert
their
> voted ballot into the machine and the machine informs the voter how the
> votes will be interpreted for counting.  We expect most vote recording
> equipment to look like this because its voter verifiable full-ballot-text
> paper ballot can achieve higher voter confidence and higher election
quality
> than today's paper ballot system.
>
>
>
> Unverified digital-ballots and feel-good slips-of-paper fail to meet the
> standards of today's paper ballot system.  This is not the time to go
> backwards.
>
>
>
> CAMBER
>
> Citizens for Accurate Mail Ballot Election Results
>
> 303-494-1540
>
> AlKolwicz@xxxxxxxxx
>
> www.users.qwest.net/~alkolwicz
>
>
>
>
>
>
>   _____
>
>
>
>
>
>