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NY TIMES

A Compromised Voting System

April 24, 2004





California's secretary of state, Kevin Shelley, is expected
to decide in the next week whether the state's electronic
voting machines can be used in November. His office has
just issued two disturbing studies - one on machine
malfunctions in last month's primary, another on misconduct
by one of the nation's leading voting machine manufacturers
- that make a strong case against the current system.
Refusing to certify the state's electronic voting machines
at this late date is a serious step, but there are
compelling reasons for Mr. Shelly to decertify some, and
perhaps all, of them.

Electronic voting is no doubt the wave of the future, but
it is being rolled out with too little thought, and without
the necessary safeguards. The two new California reports,
which are online at www.ss.ca.gov, provide strong evidence
that this is the case. The study of electronic voting in
the March 2 primary describes a slapdash system that falls
far short of the minimum standards for running an election.
A critical machine part failed on Election Day, causing
more than half of the 1,038 polling places in San Diego
County to open late and an unknown number of voters to be
turned away. Faulty equipment in another county miscounted
13,300 ballots that had been mailed in. There were also
widespread reports of teenagers' "rebooting" machines for
poll workers who could not operate them, a clear security
breach.

More disturbing than these equipment breakdowns was the
failure of machine manufacturers to have voting machines
properly certified. It is not hard to program a computer to
steal an election. A crucial safeguard is review of the
software and hardware by federal and state monitors. But
according to the report, the manufacturers regularly
flouted the certification law. Many changes were made at
the last minute, introducing the possibility of vote
tampering, or simple malfunctions. "The result was a choice
between using equipment that had not been fully tested and
approved, or using no equipment at all," the report found.

Mr. Shelley's second report singles out Diebold, a leading
manufacturer, as particularly blameworthy. Among other
serious charges, it says that last year Diebold installed
uncertified software in all 17 of the counties it served
without notifying the secretary of state, as the law
requires.

The answer to all of these problems is a "voter-verified
paper trail," a paper record that the voter can check for
accuracy. This paper trail will guard against computer
tampering by creating a hard copy of votes that can be
compared to the electronic results in a recount. Mr.
Shelley has already directed that by 2006, every electronic
voting machine in California must produce a paper trail.
Now he must decide what to do about this year's election.

A state advisory panel has urged Mr. Shelley to bar the use
of one model of Diebold machine whose certification was
improper; 15,000 of them are in place in four California
counties. Based on the two reports, this is the correct
course. Diebold's record does not inspire the sort of
confidence voters deserve. Equally important, banning these
machines is the only way to make it clear that the
certification laws must be followed scrupulously.

The harder question Mr. Shelley faces is whether to ban all
electronic voting machines that do not produce a paper
trail, as many voting experts, and some state legislators,
are urging him to do. His obligation to ensure that voting
machines function properly and inspire voter confidence
argues for a total ban. To do otherwise is to risk Election
Day meltdowns, and another presidential election in which
voters lack faith in the outcome.

There is the practical question of whether an alternative
system can be perfected in six months. It may be possible,
by using a combination of more reliable machines and paper
ballots, and perhaps some electronic machines fitted with
printers. Given the short time frame, the best course is to
proceed on two tracks: to work to put in place a system in
which every vote creates a paper record, but to keep the
existing electronic machines as a fallback.

Bad decisions by voting machine manufacturers and local
election officials have left California with a seriously
compromised election system. Mr. Shelley's job now is to
make it as reliable as reasonably possible by November.

http://www.nytimes.com/2004/04/24/opinion/24SAT1.html?ex=1083815201&ei=1&en=b4748be9159eb449


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Evan Ravitz         303 440 6838         evan@xxxxxxxx
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