HB 1227 was passed through second reading -- one reading to go.

Friends,

Contrary to the published schedule, Senators today accelerated consideration of HB 1227 and gave second reading passage to the bill. I believe this means that the bill can be approved on third (final) reading on Friday.

Almost none of them saw today’s letter to the Senators (attached and pasted below).

After the vote, I met with Colorado’s HAVA director who wrote and pushed the bill. He believes that we and U.S. Congressman Rush Holt are wrong when we say that “voter verifiable ballots are not illegal under HAVA”.

Senators Bruce Cairns and Moe Keller offered an amendment to “strengthen voter verifiability and recount” subject to Federal HAVA compliance. They were persuaded to withdraw their amendment, and did so.

Short of a miracle, this bill will pass and much damage will be done to Colorado’s election system.

We are still crossing our fingers that SJR-010 will be adopted.

Al Kolwicz

CAMBER

Citizens for Accurate Mail Ballot Election Results

2867 Tincup Circle

Boulder, CO 80305

303-494-1540

AlKolwicz@xxxxxxxxx

www.users.qwest.net/~alkolwicz

http://coloradovoter.blogspot.com

CAMBER

Citizens for Accurate Mail Ballot Election Results

2867 Tincup Circle

Boulder, CO 80305

303-494-1540

AlKolwicz@xxxxxxxxx

April 28, 2004

Colorado State Senate

200 E. Colfax
Denver, CO 80203

Dear Senator:

HB 1227 strips voters of their rights and would severely weaken our election system. This bill would not have made it out of committee except for false information presented at the committee hearing by the Secretary of State’s office.

This bill is deceptive in its complexity. It strips away power from voters and transfers this power to election officials, vendors, and those who wish to manipulate elections. The people become servants and bureaucrats become the masters.

Voters will no longer be able to verify that their votes are recorded correctly. Candidates will no longer be able to verify that all ballots are kept secure and counted, and that every vote is counted correctly. Election officials will no longer be able to use the best technology to provide secure, accurate and reliable elections.

As part of their campaign to seize these powers from the voters, the SOS’s office has provided testimony and writings that are just plain not true.

Two days ago, the SOS persuaded the Senate’s State Affairs committee to reject amendments that would help protect voters’ rights. SOS did this by testifying that HAVA funding would be lost if the amendments were adopted. Some Senate committee members said, before they voted, that this threatened loss of HAVA funding was crucial to their voting decision.

I was at the hearing and astonished to hear this SOS testimony. We contacted US Congressman Rush Holt’s HAVA expert, Michelle Mulder, who told us that this information is not true – Colorado’s receipt of HAVA funds would NOT have been affected by the amendments.

The attached Colorado Statesman column describes additional false information.

Since the hearing, I have attempted to communicate with the Colorado HAVA director to correct the misinformation and to draft suggested amendments. I have gotten no response.

HB 1227’s language is ambiguous and confusing. It is bad legislation that will likely end up in court.

Because of the number of falsehoods, one cannot ignore the possibility that there is an intentional effort to deceive the Legislature. These deceptions (intentional or otherwise) must not be rewarded. This bill should be considered only after legislators have been given corrected information.

Please vote to protect our voter’s rights. Please vote NO on HB 1227.

Al Kolwicz

With no paper trail, how do we verity a vote?

SJR 10 is the way to go

There is something deeply troubling about the way that Colorado is racing to ravage its election laws. Who is going to benefit from the elimination of the audit trail and independent overseers? Who will benefit from a system that lacks measurable criteria? Why would any freedom-loving official support these changes? Is it due to irresponsible ignorance of the facts, or something more sinister?

All across the nation, a battle is being waged to protect verifiable voting and counting. On the “for” side are top computer researchers, quality consultants, and voting system specialists who have documented reasons for rejecting the proposed shift to paperless, untrustworthy elections. On the “against” side are the hardware vendors and election officials who wish to replace traditional paper ballots with untrustworthy paperless voting equipment.

Votes marked on a paper ballot can be verified by the voter. Sighted voters can see that their votes are correctly recorded. Blind voters insert their ballot into a scanner that privately announces the votes marked on the ballot. (Disabled voters use specially equipped vote marking machines to record their votes.) If there is an error, the voter can get a replacement ballot.

Votes marked on paper ballots can be counted by hand or using optical scan equipment. Using the proper process, one can verify that each vote is correctly understood and counted.

With the proposed paperless voting machines there can be no verification. The voter cannot verify that the machine correctly recorded their vote. Officials and overseers cannot verify that the vote was correctly understood and counted.

Paperless voting was “sold” to the Federal government and is permitted by Federal legislation called the Help American Vote Act – HAVA. Notice, the word is “permitted”. Paperless Direct Recording Electronic (DRE) voting machine vendors and election officials are attempting to create the impression that paperless voting machines are “required” by HAVA. This is not true.

Senator Moe Keller has asked her colleagues in the Colorado Legislature to jointly resolve that Colorado wants to preserve its paper-based, verifiable voting system. Senate Joint Resolution, SJR04-010 “Concerning Paperless Voting Systems” which: (1) identifies the threat to election security and accuracy from paperless voting systems, (2) establishes that elections must be credible, auditable, recountable, and beyond all possible doubt, (3) requires that voter-verifiable paper ballots be the official ballots, and (4) urges our Federal representatives to proceed with great caution before adopting paperless voting in preference over voter-verified paper ballots.

Secretary of State Donetta Davidson wrote a March 25^th six-page memorandum attacking SJR04-010. In it she makes many false assertions and avoids the real questions.

Davidson writes that the resolution was made “without careful consideration of any voting system improvements.” This is not true. The resolution specifically addresses “voting system improvements …”

Davidson writes that the resolution requires “repeal of certain provisions of HAVA.” This is not true. Colorado’s own HAVA director has written that paper ballots do comply with HAVA.

Davidson writes that “there has not been a single voter verifiable voting system tested or certified at either the national or state level.” This doesn’t even make sense. For years now Colorado has been using voter verifiable paper ballots, and the Secretary of State and Clerks have vigorously stood behind paper ballots.

Davidson writes that “the statutory requirements regarding disability and language minority access would be particularly impacted.” This is not true. Davidson’s office is fully aware of voting equipment for the disabled that prints votes on paper ballots rather than recording them in unverifiable computer memory.

Davidson praises her own HB-1227 and its promise of “valuable testing and certification infrastructure.” Is the Secretary of State’s office irresponsibly ignorant about testing or attempting to deceive the legislators and the people? HB-1227 fails to define any criteria for testing voting systems; it makes independent oversight impossible; and it throws open the door to abuse by insiders.

One place where we agree with Davidson is when she writes, “Merely adding a printer to a voting system in order to print a ballot for purposes of recount does not make the system secure.” The printed vote can be different than the vote recorded in computer memory and would rarely be counted.

The real questions are these: (1) how do voters and election officials verify that a paperless vote that the voter thought they cast is the vote that actually gets counted, and (2) what can possibly be recounted when there is no physical record of the voter’s intent?

SJR04-010 lets the Secretary of State know that the legislators and the people want to protect Colorado elections from reckless vendors and uninformed officials. Paperless voting systems must be rejected until they are as reliable, secure, and accurate as our current paper ballot system.

Voters who care about their vote need to contact their representatives and ask them to support SJR04-010.

Al Kolwicz and Pete Klammer are bi-partisan members of the IEEE National Committee on Voting Equipment Standards - P1583. Email: alkolwicz@xxxxxxxxx pklammer@xxxxxxxxxxx