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Worth repeating
On the virtues of Voter Verified Paper Ballots
My own point of advocacy regarding paper ballots has matured since I took up
the topic last year. It could well mature some more, so understand I enter
the discussion in a spirit of debate, rather than dogma.
I argue two points: what should a ballot be, and how weak a paper trail may
be if it is not a ballot.
On the first, the term "electronic ballot" must be an intrinsic oxymoron.
What is a ballot, if it is not a unique and durable record of a voter's
expressed choice?
To be unique, a ballot must be resistant to duplication, or fabrication out
of thin air; it should be difficult, and not just technically difficult, but
obviously and evidently difficult from a layman's view, to produce anything
more than N ballots from N voters. I don't see how electromagnetic
potentials in semiconductors, magnetic media, or flash storage can meet this
criterion. In fact, most vendors consider it a virtue that there are at
least three copies of every ballot inside their cases; and in any case, the
ease with which N electronic records can be duplicated, or replicated to any
desired number, without visible burden, is breathtaking. A ballot should
not have this quality.
To be durable, a ballot must be resistant to destruction, or misplacement or
concealment; it should be difficult, and not just technically difficult, but
obviously and evidently difficult from a layman's point of view, to produce
anything less than N ballots from N voters. The ease with which
computerized memories can be forgotten, erased, mislabeled, misplaced,
shifted around, and deleted by dozens, hundreds, or many thousands, in an
eyeblink without the least puff of smoke or trace of ash, is stunning. This
quality is contrary to the purpose of a ballot.
It may be inconvenient, or labor-intensive, or downright wearying, that any
significant number of paper ballots have mass, take up space, and require
energy, thoughtfully applied, to move from place to place, but it is
altogether appropriate that this is so. It may be convenient that so-called
"electronic ballots" can enter or leave a sealed room undetectable by guards
at the door, but it is not appropriate. It may give election administrators
considerable ease, and increased leisure, that paperless voting systems can
be reproduced effortlessly, with mere keypresses and mouse clicks, but this
is entirely inappropriate convenience. It is not a goal of elections to get
clerks home for dinner as early as possible; nor is it requisite that they
labor uselessly in symbolic drudgery; but the very work that it takes to
handle ballots properly is itself a confidence-builder for voters that their
participation is not trivial.
As to the second, the non-ballot paper audit trail is a new legal animal,
and a potential monstrosity. There are clear statutes and stern
consequences for the destruction, counterfeiting, or diversion of ballots,
and everybody from the Secretary of State down to John Q. Public is
perfectly clear on that. But what would the penalty be for copying what is
already a copy to start with? Or discarding them at the wrong moment, or
conveniently forgetting certain bagsful of them in the trunk of your car?
Would any of these mishaps be crimes, and if so, then felonies or littering?
If these paper audit trails are to remain as important as there purpose
implies, a whole manifest of law, paralleling ballot law, will be needed, to
the point that either they will be virtual ballots in effect, or else they
will be unprotected and vulnerable.
And what will the law make of this new animal? Neither fish nor fowl, they
create a brand new arena of disputation in cases of challenge before the
court. If the "ballots" yield one count, and these "things" produce another
count, what judge would easily rule that the "things" should trump the
"ballots," or else what is the legal definition of ballot? It does not seem
healthy for the state of the republic to create fresh fodder for such
contention.
So here now my initial responses to Dave's two questions ...
> What purpose(s) does voter-verification serve, and how does it contribute
to the overall purpose of the system?
First of all, it recognizes, nay, highlights, the fact that there IS in fact
a system, with an overall purpose, and not just mere components sufficient
in self-contained consistency. It is not enough for the IEEE to say that
such-and-such a vote-registering machine is certifiable. Any effort that
does not sufficiently consider the total election process is bankrupt. If
the "overall purpose of the system" is merely to produce "acceptable"
results, then half the game becomes one of reducing voters' expectations.
The "overall purpose" of our election system is not simply to produce
correct results, it is in fact twofold: to produce provably correct results,
while giving its users confidence that it is doing so.
It's not enough to be bad-smelling medicine that works nonetheless. Healthy
democracy depends on broad, committed participation. The election system
has to sell itself, at every election, and with every voter's contact with
it. It is important for the "voting experience" to be credible enough to
disarm even the most vocal skeptics, because unchallengeable doubts sap
voter confidence. IEEE's contribution must strengthen and reinforce a
process that justifiably earns every voter's confidence, by demonstrably and
convincingly tending towards vanishlingly small error.
Meanwhile, voter verification serves the purpose of on-the-spot continuous
quality control, in the only context that really matters. It doesn't matter
if a machine passes a logic-and-accuracy check, or any other administered
test, if on election day at any point, for even a single voter, it fails in
any way. And conversely, the system is immune to whatever electronic
failures, in test or while live, as long as the voter can produce a paper
ballot to his satisfaction, which will be counted to supersede any
electronic results.
A voter-verified paper ballot both provides a basis for measurable credible
accuracy, and is easily understood by average citizens as convincing
evidence of such accuracy.
> * What functional properties are essential to achieving the stated
purposes ?
Material physicality is a functional property. There is nothing else in
this universe that occupies space, comprises mass, and responds to work and
energy, like matter. Most citizens are savvy to the difference between a
brick, a picture of a brick, and a digitized memory of a picture of a brick.
The brick is the one that is hardest to counterfeit, most difficult to
conceal or dispose of without notice. In an election system, such hurdles
are virtues. These attributes argue for a ballot that is a material,
physical artifact, durable and substantial, despite the messy nuisance such
materiality entails. It's worth it.
I am not arguing for a new standard; I am arguing for the restoration of a
traditional one.
--
Pete Klammer / ACM(1970), IEEE, ICCP(CCP), NSPE(PE), NACSE(NSNE)
3200 Routt Street / Wheat Ridge, Colorado 80033-5452
(303)233-9485 / Fax:(303)274-6182 / Mailto:PKlammer@xxxxxxx
Idealism may not win every contest, but that's not what I choose it for!
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Konopasek, Scott
> Sent: Thursday, January 29, 2004 1:04 PM
> To: 'Dave Aragon'; Dana DeBeauvior - Travis County; David
> Aragon - VoterMarch.org; Doug Fletcher; David Dill; Ian
> Piper; Jacques Hulshof; Jim Thatcher; Jim Adler -
> VoteHere.net; Larry Korb - Sequoia; Rebecca Mercuri; Neil
> McClure; Pete Klammer; Philip Scruggs; Bob Oliver - Populex;
> Bob Hogzett - ES&S; Stan Klein; Vince Lipsio; Bill Welsh - ES&S
> Subject: RE: [STG3] Mail test, and new member
>
>
> Hello everyone;
>
> I am looking forward to participating in STG3 on a topic on
> which I know
> many of us have strong personal or professional views.
>
> Although I'm the new guy I thought I might as well jump in
> with both feet
> right away by responding to Dave's questions below.
>
>
> * What purpose(s) does voter-verification serve, and how does it
> contribute to the overall purpose of the system
>
> * What functional properties are essential to achieving the stated
> purposes
>
> Voter verification, in addition to features already in place
> in DRE systems,
> provides an additional opportunity for the voter to be
> assured that his/her
> votes are being recorded as intended. When used in conjunction with
> existing auditing and testing protocols, voter verification has the
> potential of offering an additional audit tool based upon
> individual voter
> affirmations that the votes are recorded correctly. The
> presumed overall
> effect would be to enhance voter confidence and to maintain
> the legitimacy
> of an election. However, the actual value of such a feature
> is subject to
> discussion as the need for the feature is based upon
> incomplete analyses of
> the threats and risks posed to electronic voting systems.
>
> There is a deterministic, rather than scientific, assumption
> that a voter
> verified feature must be paper based. While well intended,
> the assumption
> of the inherent superiority of paper ignores the fact that
> there was a paper
> trail in the Presidential election of 2000 in the counties of
> south Florida
> that triggered the current conversion to electronic voting systems.
>
> There is a second, and quite dangerous, assumption the paper
> audit somehow
> becomes or should be the ballot. If one's objective is to
> have a DRE create
> a paper ballot that would be the official record of the
> voter's votes, then
> the rhetoric of a voter verified paper audit trail is hollow.
> If this is
> the case, DREs should be banned rather than converted to expensive
> electronic pencils. On the other hand, if the objective is
> to be able to
> more comprehensively verify the accuracy, security and integrity of an
> electronic voting system, then such a goal can and should be
> met without
> conferring ballot status on the paper audit trail.
>
> I am attaching the DRE voting system audit ordinance for San
> Bernardino
> County which describes how a paper audit trail will be used
> without being
> considered a ballot. For the record, San Bernardino County
> has taken the
> position that a paper audit trail is desirable and has
> provisions in its DRE
> contract requiring the vendor to develop and provide a paper
> audit trail. I
> expect to be among the first, if not the first, to put such a
> system into
> operation.
>
>
> Scott O. Konopasek
> Registrar of Voters
> 777 E. Rialto Ave
> San Bernardino, CA 92415
> 909.387.2083
> 909.387.2022 (fax)