RE: What To Say About Paper When Optically Scanned

["Pete Klammer" <pklammer@xxxxxxxxxxx>]

Provisional ballots	Absentee ballots
-------------------	----------------
On paper (this year)*	On paper
Screened for counting	Screened for counting
Possibly not counted	Possibly not counted
Counting is verifiable	Counting is NOT verifiable
Voted in polling place	Voted anywhere
Voted in privacy		Voted with possible "help"
Counted after election	Counted in advance of election
Touched only by judges	Touched by common mail delivery
Makes a statement		Looks like lazy stay-at-home voters

(*) There are plans to put even provisional ballots on paperless DRE in the
future; these arguments won't apply then.
--
Pete Klammer, P.E. / ACM(1970), IEEE(SA,P1583), ICCP(CCP), NSPE(PE)
   3200 Routt Street / Wheat Ridge, Colorado 80033-5452
 (303)233-9485 / Fax:(303)274-6182 / Mailto:PKlammer@xxxxxxx
   "Either Be Good, or Else Be Careful, but Do Have Fun! "
 

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Robert Mcgrath [mailto:mcgrath_mcnally@xxxxxxx] 
> Sent: Sunday, September 19, 2004 10:57 PM
> To: TresCeeA@xxxxxxx; davide475@xxxxxxxx; 
> summerstorm03@xxxxxxxxxxx; donna@xxxxxxxxxxxx; 
> pklammer@xxxxxxx; mlambie@xxxxxxxxxxx; peter.raich@xxxxxxxx; 
> jpezzillo@xxxxxxxxx; bthack@xxxxxxxxxxx; laurieannb@xxxxxxx; 
> dougrcurtis@xxxxxxxxxxx; SDeLeo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx; 
> Margitjo@xxxxxxx; myriah@xxxxxxxxx; s.sadler@xxxxxxx; 
> taichiproj@xxxxxxxxxxxxx; toso@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx; 
> AlKolwicz@xxxxxxxxx; carolyn@xxxxxxxxx; 
> ellen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx; cary.lacklen@xxxxxxxxxxx; 
> claudiakuhns@xxxxxxxxxxx; mark@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> Cc: cvv-discuss@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> Subject: What To Say About Paper When Optically Scanned
> 
> I have been lobbied by a couple of knowledgeable people asking me to 
> reconsider my statement advocating the use of absentee 
> ballots even when the 
> polling place offers hand marked paper ballots that are 
> optically scanned.
> 
> I have been told that to advocate absentee ballots in this 
> instance is 
> wrong, because either it is an unnecessary risk, it subjects votes to 
> additional scrutiny that is unwarranted, it makes no sense 
> because all 
> absentee ballots are optically scanned anyway, or it won't 
> cause any change 
> in the way votes are counted.
> 
> I point out the need to avoid optical scans in the first 
> place because of 4 
> items, explained below.   However, I am willing to revise 
> this earlier 
> recommendation on absentee ballots in counties where they 
> already vote on 
> paper ballots, since they are already read by optical 
> scanners.  I do still 
> wish to force manual recounts of all optically scanned votes, 
> but am not 
> sure how to cause this to happen other than through challenges to the 
> results after the elections, since no one is willing to make any more 
> changes this close to the election.
> 
> Here are the four items that continue to concern me, and that 
> cause me to 
> want people to come out of their complacency over optical 
> scanners as a 
> "necessary evil but probably ok":
> 
> The first is a posting by Joe Pezillo back in April, 
> retelling about a 
> county in San Diego that miscounted 3000 ballots via optical scanner:
> 
> 
> 
> Here's a yet another sad example of why just casting your 
> ballots on  paper 
> isn't enough, note that it was only during a post-election 
> review  that the 
> problems were found. All the more reason to be able to have  
> verification 
> when the ballots are being counted, not just during  
> pre-election testing of 
> equipment, and of course, yet another reason to  reject the 
> machines and 
> their manufacturer's continued false claims of  the quality 
> of their systems 
> altogether. I wonder if this is the same  system that we used 
> in Boulder 
> County in November, or worse, an  "improved" version of that system:
> 
> 
> "An article in today's San Diego Union Tribune reveals nearly  3000  
> absentee ballots in the San Diego primary one month ago were  
> miscounted. 
> 'The miscounts occurred because multiple scanners  
> simultaneously fed the 
> absentee ballot data into the computer  tabulation system. 
> The large number 
> of ballots and candidates on them  overwhelmed the system. 
> Diebold spokesman 
> David Bear said the company  has provided a software fix to 
> the county for 
> the new problem.' The  irregularities were found in a routine 
> post-election 
> review."
> 
> 
> http://slashdot.org/articles/04/04/08/1828200.shtml? 
> tid=103&tid=126&tid=172&tid=99
> 
> The second point is a story covered also in April this year 
> about several 
> county races that certified the wrong winners, and a school mill levy 
> referendum that was defeated, due to an error with the 
> optical scan count in 
> Garfield County.  It took a manual recount to discover that 
> several scanned 
> ballots were skipped, causing the elections to be incorrect, 
> since some of 
> them were marked in pen instead of pencil, which the scanners 
> could not 
> read.  Inconsistent instructions on the ballots vs. on the 
> secrecy sleeve 
> caused voters to use pen or pencil.
> 
> The third point is a story emerging over the past few weeks 
> by Bev Harris, 
> at www.blackboxvoting.org, in which she highlights secret 
> codes that exist 
> in Diebold central tabulators that allow hackers to enter 
> back-doors (even 
> remotely) to change elections.  Many of Colorado's counties 
> run this central 
> tabulation software, for their scanners, I believe.
> 
> Finally, as we started this whole endeavor over verifiable 
> voting almost a 
> year ago, we quoted Stalin who said (and I paraphrase): "It's 
> not the votes 
> that count, it's who counts the votes."  Whether a DRE steals 
> an election or 
> not, the counting software certainly can, especially if it's 
> in a computer 
> too.
> 
> But for the sake of argument, let's say we advocate absentee 
> only in DRE 
> counties.  That's still half the precincts in the state, but 
> does help us 
> target many fewer counties and could be more feasible.
> 
> Thoughts before I post the entire group on this?
> 
> Bob McGrath
> Director, CFVI
> www.cfvi.org
> 
> 
>