Cuyahoga Election Review Panel Report: unauditable comedy of errors

[Neal McBurnett <neal@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

Some scary nuggets from the Cuyahoga Election Review Panel Report and
their experience with Diebold equipment and others.

Since 2004, we've documented the same auditing problem that they
highlight.  Please join the call to address the problem.

Neal McBurnett                 http://mcburnett.org/neal/

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Re: Cuyahoga Election Review Panel Report 

 http://josephhall.org/nqb2/index.php/2006/07/21/cuyahoga2006prim

 ...

 VVPAT is useless without audits (and a nod to the Brennan Center
 report).

  2.74 Recommendation: The CCBOE should conduct automatic routine,
  random audits of VVPATS according to standards that are announced
  and vetted in a public process. Audits are recommended by the
  Brennan Center for Justice's 6/27/2006 report on voting machine
  security. Further, the Center includes specific guidelines for
  conducting a VVPAT audit in this report. Failure to conduct regular
  and meaningful audits of VVPATs increases the security risks
  greatly.

Problems with DREs,

 5.19 Finding: The numerous media on which voting data were stored
 (DRE memory cards, zero cards, CCBOE central computer, DRE internal
 memory, VVPAT paper rolls) led to general confusion of poll workers
 and CCBOE staff at to which medium carried the official votes. No
 single medium took on the "precious cargo" status of the paper
 ballots and ballot boxes of old.
 
 Lost memory cards are dangerous. If someone did use a Hursti II-like
 hack to modify vote totals, disappearing a memory card would be a
 great way to hide the evidence.

 people didn't realize they should look at the VVPAT due to the TSx's
 design where an opaque cover is placed over the VVPAT window.

 Because many didn't look at the VVPAT, a paper jam resulted in
 multiple VVPATs printing over each other, thereby invalidating the
 official record of the vote.

Need to certify voter registration system:

  2.30 Recommendation: Although a voter registration system does not
  directly influence the recording and tabulation of votes, it
  indirectly influences the final outcome of the voting process
  because the system determines who is eligible to vote. The functions
  of voter registration systems are significant enough that they
  should be thoroughly analyzed before implementation. It is essential
  that all technologies that are used in the election process undergo
  rigorous certification assessments. CCBOE joined by the Cuyahoga
  County Commissioners and public interest groups should file a
  petition with the U.S. Election Assistance Commission the Ohio
  General Assembly and the Ohio Secretary of State requesting their
  creation of certification standards.



-Neal

----- Forwarded message from Cere Davis <ceremona@xxxxxxxxx> -----

To: CPSR Voting Technology Working Group <vote-wg@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
From: Cere Davis <ceremona@xxxxxxxxx>
Subject: [vote-wg] anyone interested in how elections can go very wrong should look at this blog

 http://josephhall.org/nqb2/index.php/2006/07/21/cuyahoga2006prim
 --
 Cere Davis