RE: precinct level results

-------- Original Message --------
Subject: Re: precinct level results
From: Neal McBurnett <neal@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Date: Fri, November 10, 2006 1:01 pm
To: cvv-discuss@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, Hillary Hall
<hillary@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>

The Hart JBC machines can print a "tally" of the electronic votes at
the precinct. During the training in July for the primary this year I
noticed that this option was not available during the closing of the
polls. I complained to the elections division and the Canvass board
(and to this list - "Subject: Post-Election Audits for DREs require
JBC tally report"), but nothing was done to fix it. A real audit was
not done during the primary - just a partial recount of selected
machines, and hand counts to validate the recounts. That is nearly
worthless as I've pointed out for the last 2 years. We should be
auditing the actual results, which need to be provided in sufficient
detail, and linked to the paper records. But either the Hart system
can't produce those reports, or the county refuses to do so.

In October, during the election judge training for the general
election, the "print tally" option did show up on the JBCs and I was
thrilled. We printed one out during the time when the judges learned
about the machines and tried voting some demo ballots. We were
immediately castigated by the person who led the training, who
confiscated the tape we had printed. They explained that the "print
tally" function was not supposed to be there - that they had
misprogrammed the machines. Huh. They don't seem to want us to
understand that these machines can indeed produce the sorts of
auditable results we need.

During the actual election, I ran the machine, and the instructions on
page 60 said "press the arrow next to the bottom-left option on the
JBC screen. Leave this copy of the final report on the JBC"

The option in the bottom left was the "print tally" button! But this
instruction differed from the instructions in the other checklist we
were working from. We called, and were once again told the machine
was misprogrammed, the book was wrong, and we should NOT print the
tally out! The supply judge and I were very frustrated.

By the way, to audit the absentee and early vote we need results at a
different level than "precinct level results". That's because
absentee and early vote paper records aren't sorted by precinct, and
we need to have results reported in the same way that the paper
records are. I.e. we need results for each machine or each batch of
votes. We need results at a level that lets us go back, find the
associated paper records, and audit the results.

Please help get this message across! Only a real audit of the real
results can protect against a wide variety of flaws or attacks against
the election.

Neal McBurnett http://mcburnett.org/neal/

>...
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Margit Johansson [mailto:margitjo@xxxxxxxxx]
> Sent: Thursday, November 09, 2006 10:42 PM
> To: paul.tiger@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
> Cc: cvv-discuss@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx; Hillary Hall
> Subject: Re: precinct level results
>
> Nancy Wurl told me they weren't posted at precincts because they weren't
> counted there. They are posted at the County Clerk's office.
>
> Margit
>
> Margit Johansson
>
> 303-442-1668/ margitjo@xxxxxxxxx
>
> On 11/9/06, paul.tiger@xxxxxxxxxxxxx <paul.tiger@xxxxxxxxxxxxx > wrote:
>
> Paul (et al),
>
> In 04 the same was true in Boulder County. A gal who works with CFVI called me
> and mentioned that she had been driving around BC looking for the required
> postings at precinct locations. I was sort of aware of it, but had forgotten
> since we hadn't done that in years in Boulder.
>
> The Law stands and Boulder ignores it. I had a very unpleasant conversation
> with Jim Burrus, former mouthpiece for the commissioners about this issue. He
> told me I was making it up, then when he figured out that I wasn't making it up
> said that it was just too hard to do and I should lay off Linda Salas (who he
> supported in her re-election bid).
>
> Here's the CRS:
>
> 1-7-602. Judges to post returns.
>
> "At any election at a polling place where voting is by paper ballot, voting
> machine, or electronic or electromechanical voting system, the election judges
> shall make an abstract of the count of votes, which abstract shall contain the
> names of the offices, names of the candidates, ballot titles, and submission
> clauses of all initiated, referred, or other ballot issues voted upon and the
> number of votes counted for or against each candidate or ballot issue. The
> abstract shall be posted in a conspicuous place that can be seen from the
> outside of the polling place immediately upon completion of the counting. The
> abstract may be removed at any time after forty-eight hours following the
> election. Suitable blanks for the abstract required by this section shall be
> prepared, printed, and furnished to all election judges at the same time and in
> the same manner as other election supplies."
>
>
>
> The response that I got from the clerk's office in regards to this was varied.
> Nancy Jo understood that the results should be posted at polling locations. Tom
> and Linda had other ideas. Water under the bridge.
>
> Mind you that in 2004 the wording of 1-7-602 was a bit different. It didn't
> include "voting machine, or electronic or electromechanical voting system",
> that was stuck added in 2005. What was there in 2004 running back all the way
> to 1993 was "paper ballot".
>
>
>
> The Hart/InterCivic system has serialized the ballots themselves in such a way
> as to have the precinct locations encoded on them. Therefore, after all is said
> and done, it is VERY EASY to know exactly what the counts were in individual
> precincts. People that say that they cannot know this are either not well
> enough informed, or they are simply lying. But that is in Boulder County.
>
>
>
> Larimer's system uses primarily electronic methods. The ballots in the
> electronic systems do indeed know what the ballot style is and therefore the
> precinct. But if a Larimer voted used a paper ballot, I do not believe that
> there is a way to track those ballots back to a precinct if they are unbundled
> at a central location.
>
>
>
> Whatever excuse election officials may have for not posting results AT THE
> POLLING LOCATION, it is unacceptable. It is actually a criminal event.
>
>
>
> paul tiger
>
>
>
>
>
>
> -------- Original Message --------
> Subject: Re: DC Article: "Larimer Shows Up Boulder"
> From: Paul E Condon < pecondon@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> Date: Thu, November 09, 2006 3:14 pm
> To: cvv-discuss@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
>
> On Thu, Nov 09, 2006 at 10:46:48AM -0700, Dr. Charles E. Corry wrote:
> > El Paso County, Colorado, the largest county by population in the
> > state, rejected voting centers two years ago and relied heavily on
> > traditional precinct balloting in the November 2006 election.
> > Few, if any problems were noted and the counting and tabulation
> > were swiftly completed, despite the fact we use Diebold here, thanks
> > to an effective and hard-working county clerk and his staff.
> > When looking at the claimed success of Larimer County, after
> > three troublesome years, one should carefully evaluate the percentage
> > of voters who used absentee ballots or voted early due to problems in
> > previous elections with voting centers.
>
> I have heard that Larimer County was unable to report precinct level
> voting results for the 2004 election. No one gave them permission to
> not report at this level. They just couldn't do it because of poor
> planning and design. I would say that their 2004 election was a
> serious failure that no one had the courage and/or power to address.
>
> Without even precinct level results, how can one say whether or not
> the election was properly executed? The next step is to just report
> the name of the winner without all the pesky details of numbers that
> are supposed to add up.
>
> --
> Paul E Condon
> pecondon@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
>
>
>