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Hi All,
Are you sending these to Claudia
Kuhns?
Should they be forwarded to SoS Coffman for a
"reply" ? or some other way to be sure that his office is aware of these
(of course they should be).
Let's get rid of the DREs, then
we go to all paper in 2008, -- hand counted at precincts
(we need a lot of volunteers to watch & help with this); maybe op-scan
counted centrally in 2008,(sign up to be an observer) ,hopefully at precincts by
2010? (still need one DRE for disabled?(with VVPR) per voting
place.
.
Joel
----- Original Message -----
Sent: Wednesday, December 05, 2007 1:41
PM
Subject: Fwd: Diebold Tabulation Software
Goes on Trial in Pima County, Arizona
---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: Tmmco1@xxxxxxx <Tmmco1@xxxxxxx>
Date: Dec 4, 2007
10:44 PM
Subject: Diebold Tabulation Software Goes on Trial in Pima County,
Arizona
To: Margitjo@xxxxxxxxx
Margit,
From iBeta report:
During testing it was discovered that the GEMS software exhibits
fundamental security flaws that make definitive validation of data impossible
due to the ease of data and log manipulation from outside the GEMS software
itself. Ultimately, it is the determination of iBeta that the overwriting of
the target file can be attributed to human error. iBeta arrives at the "human
error" conclusion for two reasons:
• iBeta was unable to detect any
manipulation of the 051606 event data across the multiple copies of the data
discovered.
• The basis of the investigation is that there are log entries
that point to tampering - but it is far
easier to remove evidence of
tampering from the logs than to actually tamper with the vote totals
in the
Microsoft Access database that the GEMS software uses. So it does not follow
that someone with the knowledge to manipulate the GEMS data would neglect to
alter the log file to remove the evidence of the manipulation.
Tm
The Pima County Democratic Party sues Pima county for public records
access to election databases
................
Guest Blogged by Michael
Bryan
http://www.bradblog.com/?p=5384
..........
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