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Fwd: Dems allowing overseas voters to vote by email.BAD



Hi All,
I sent this out to a Rocky Mt. News reporter, and a couple of others.  If you have media contacts, it would be very helpful if you could get this article by experts Dill and Simons some wider exposure.  Last I heard, it has been a struggle to get this important and timely message out to the general public. No surprise there, but we must keep on trying.
Thanks.
Margit
 
Margit Johansson
303-442-1668/ margitjo@xxxxxxxxx

---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: Margit Johansson <margitjo@xxxxxxxxx>
Date: Feb 5, 2008 11:25 AM
Subject: Dems allowing overseas voters to vote by email.BAD
To: kimm@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

 
Dear Ms.Kim,
     Could you see if the write-up below (and attached) by two eminent computer scientists could be run as an op-ed, or could you incorporate the information in an article?  Although not obvious to the lay person, the issue of voting by email is extremely important, as it is very INSECURE.
     The Democrats are, as we speak, allowing overseas Americans to circumvent the state primaries to vote online, although this puts their votes in jeopardy (and so indirectly affects us all).
     Author David Dill, a professor at Stanford, was instrumental in 2002 in getting the word out on the insecurity of unverifiable voting with electronic machines, and author Barbara Simon was one of the authors of the report that concluded that email voting could not be made secure, which discouraged the military (temporarily) from foisting this scheme on our overseas military. (Colorado has the dubious distinction of being one of seven states to allow overseas military to return voted ballots by email.)
     I think the piece "The Democratic Party's Dangerous Experiment" can be found on the verifiedvoting.org and votetrustusa.org websites.  Pam Smith at verifiedvoting.org (pam@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx) can give you particulars on how to contact the authors.  The public really needs to be informed about this latest threat to elections, which means the issue needs to be covered in the mainstream media.  As I say, since we use email so much now, it is not obvious to us that the internet is not secure at this time for voting; we need to be educated on this.
Thanks very much.
Sincerely,
Margit Johansson, Ph.D.
Coloradoans for Voting Integrity
303-442-1668/ margitjo@xxxxxxxxx
 

The Democratic Party's Dangerous Experiment

 

By David L. Dill and Barbara Simons   

February 02, 2008

As most of us now understand, paperless electronic voting is a really bad idea. But there is a still worse idea: voting over the Internet.

Voters may worry about whether voting machines were hacked by programmers or poll-workers who have machines stored in their homes prior to an election. But with internet voting, we must also worry about whether the system has been hacked by a teenager in Eastern Europe, organized crime, or even an unfriendly government. We must worry about network failure, "denial of service"attacks that shut down selected machines on the internet, counterfeit Internet websites, and spyware and/or viruses on the computers used to cast votes. And we must worry about whether the people running the system are engaging in electronic ballot-stuffing.

Like whack-a-mole, internet voting proposals have reappeared in different guises in the U.S. for much of the past decade. When an extremely ambitious Department of Defense proposal for internet voting in the 2004 presidential election was reviewed by computer security experts, it was terminated because of
security concerns documented by those experts - the same concerns that should cause all citizens to view any proposal for internet voting with extreme skepticism.

Nonetheless, on Super Tuesday the Democratic Party is going to deploy internet voting. Democrats living outside the country will be treated as a 51st state, called Democrats Abroad, and will elect delegates to the convention. This approach adroitly side-steps almost all regulation on election technology, which typically are matters of state, not Federal, law. Internet voting won't even be subjected to the notoriously inadequate certification process that applies to almost every other voting system in the U.S. The organizers apparently maintain their confidence in the security of internet voting by not consulting anyone who might, as happened in 2004, warn them of risks. (We know most, if not all, of the independent experts in internet voting in the U.S., and none of them has been asked to examine this system).

 

Security may not be the only issue with this system. On their web page, Everyone Counts cites the recent "successful" election in Swindon, U.K, even though the U.K. Electoral Commission reports that "Electronic polling stations in Swindon proved more problematic, with many experiencing connectivity and application issues on polling day." For this and other reasons, the Electoral Commission recommended a moratorium on further e-voting trials in the U.K. until security and other concerns are resolved.

 

So, why should expatriate Democrats trust Everyone Counts with their votes? We don't know. What we've been able to discover in a few Internet searches is that the company was spun off from an Australian company in 2003, and (as of two years ago) the majority shareholder is an Australian. In 2006, they received an "injection of US private equity" from an undisclosed source. We can't tell you which candidate, if any, the source of the private equity supports.

 

There are only a few delegates allocated to Democrats Abroad. So it is unlikely, but not impossible, that the delegate selection resulting from the internet voting process will be decisive in choosing the Democratic nominee for president. Whatever the outcome, it will be impossible for a candidate to obtain a recount, because there will be no meaningful ballots to recount.

 

Even if internet voting does not impact the presidential nomination, there is a big risk. Though no one will know if the votes were correctly recorded and counted, the "success" of this experiment will be cited as a reason to expand the use of internet voting.

 

We understand that voting is unnecessarily difficult for many expatriate Americans. That is unacceptable. But it is also unacceptable to force citizens to trust their votes to a system that has not been demonstrated to be trustworthy. We need to consider more sensible and secure ways to assist Americans living abroad. For example, we might develop a uniform system for printing absentee ballots remotely, so that it is not necessary to mail ballots to voters weeks in advance. We might consider making deadlines for receiving voted ballots a bit more flexible. Perhaps ballots could even be delivered by FedEx or DHL.

 

This radically new and untested voting scheme was announced only a short time ago. Press coverage has been minimal and uncritical. Unfortunately, because voters planning to vote over the internet no longer have time to obtain absentee ballots before the primary, it is too late to kill this dangerous proposal. We urge American expatriates to vote, however they can - even if it involves using this system - and then to tell their representatives that paper ballots must be required in the future for all voters, including those outside the country. Americans living abroad should not be treated as second-class citizens.

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