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HAVA complaint against HART eSlate certification

 

 

From: Al Kolwicz [mailto:alkolwicz@qwest.net]
Sent: Wednesday, May 17, 2006 3:29 PM
To: 'Dana Williams'
Cc: Bill Hobbs; Gigi Dennis ; John Gardner; Linda Salas; Monica Marquez; Shelley Bailey; Wayne Munster;
      Dean Schooler; Dr. Charles Corry; Harvie Branscomb; Joe Pezzillo; Robert Corry; Sheila Horton
Subject: RE: HAVA Complaint - SOS-HAVA-01-06-0001

 

Ms.  Williams:

 

RE:  Colorado Open Records request, May 12, 2006

 

We received your e-mail of May 16th.  Our request is not satisfied by the data you have provided.  

 

We have elaborated the description of our four requests.  We ask that you quickly respond to our request for this data.

 

Request for policies

 

REQUEST - May 12: Policy regarding the de-certification of voting equipment including the policy regarding the use of certified voting equipment that is found to be out of compliance with Colorado requirements, and the policy regarding the purchase of certified voting equipment when it has been discovered before the purchase that the equipment does not meet requirements.

 

RESPONSE - May 16 : Certification and decertification are governed by HAVA, the state election code, and the Secretary of State’s election rules.  For example, decertification is referred to in section 1-5-621, C.R.S., and SOS Election Rule 45.9.  Rule 45 is available on our website.  If you need copies of any of these documents, please let me know.  The Secretary of State does not have any other written "policy regarding the de-certification of voting equipment".

 

DISCUSSION - May 17: The referenced documents establish that: 

  1. the Secretary of State is the authority that decides whether to decertify - CRS 1-5-621(1),

  2. the Secretary of State is obliged to determine whether the system complies with the applicable requirements or deviates from a certified system - CRS 1-5-621(4), 

  3. the remedy to be taken, if the system does not comply with applicable standards or deviates from a certified system, is to be chosen from a list of options (i) specify remedy actions, (ii) prohibit use, (iii) limit use, or (iv) decertify - CRS 1-5-621(4), and

  4. the SOS will withdraw the certification of a system for future use and sale in Colorado if after certification it is discovered that the voting system fails to meet the standards - Election Rule 45.9.

Please confirm our interpretation that these documents require that the eSlate certification will be withdrawn if it demonstrated that the eSlate fails to meet any of the following: 

  1. Article VII section 8 of Colorado Constitution

  2. CRS 1-5-704(1)(n) I, IV, V, and VI

  3. TITLE III Sec 301(a)(1)

  4. TITLE III Sec 301(a)(2)(B)(ii)

  5. TITLE III Sec 301(a)(3)(A)

Request for test cases

 

REQUEST - May 12: Test cases that were used by federal and state Independent Testing Authorities to verify that a blind voter can verify the votes recorded on the paper record of votes (the audit trail in the case of the eSlate voting equipment), and to verify that the eSlate provides anonymous voting.

 

RESPONSE- May 16: Although I am not quite sure what you mean by "test cases" used by Independent Testing Authorities, the Secretary of State does not maintain records of the ITA's. We suggest you contact the ITA's.

 

DISCUSSION - May 17:  The documentation you refer to above explains what is meant by "test cases".

Rule 45.6.2.3 - General Testing Procedures and Instructions

 

Each voting system shall be tested and examined by conducting two mock elections – a Presidential Primary and a Coordinated election.


Rule 45 - Rules Concerning Voting System Standards for Certification

 

… the voting system provider shall submit … documentation of … test and verification specifications …

 

Rule 45.4 - Application procedure

 

All materials submitted to the SOS shall become the property of the SOS upon submission.

 

Rule 45.6.2.2 - SOS requirements for testing:

 

45.6.2.2.3 A log of the testing procedure shall be maintained and recorded on file with the SOS. This log shall identify the system and all components by voting system provider name, make, model, serial number, software version, firmware version, date tested, test number, test description, notes of test, and results of test. All test environment conditions shall be noted.

 

45.6.2.2.4 All operating steps, the identity and quantity of simulated ballots, annotations of output reports, and observations of performance shall be recorded.

 

45.6.2.2.5 In the event that a deviation to requirements pertaining to the test environment, voting system arrangement and method of operation, the specified test procedure, or the provision of test instrumentation and facilities is required, this deviation shall be recorded in the test log together with a discussion of the reason for the deviation and a statement of the effect of the deviation on the validity of the test procedure.

 

With this clarification, I hope that you will now fulfill our request for records.

 

Request for communications regarding non-secret ballots and unverifiable voting records

 

REQUEST  May 12: Writings that the Secretary of State has created that declare that Article VII section 8 of the Colorado Constitution is unclear or ambiguous, or otherwise assess the meaning of the article, and writings that the Secretary of State has created that contend that the HAVA sections cited in the complaint are unclear or ambiguous, or otherwise assess the meaning of these sections.

 

RESPONSE – May 16: There are no qualifying records concerning your third request.

 

DISCUSSION - May 17:  The response is not sufficient.

 

The roll-paper and bar-code used by the eSlate VVPAT creates a situation where ballots are marked in a way whereby the ballot can be identified as the ballot of the person casting it.  Is this a surprise to the Secretary of State, or was there discussion of this potential?  If there was discussion, we want to be privy to this discussion; if there was no discussion, we want to know that there was no such discussion.  How do we accomplish this?

 

The roll-paper and bar-code used by the eSlate VVPAT creates a situation where a blind voter cannot verify the data printed on the VVPAT.  Is this a surprise to the Secretary of State, or was there discussion of this potential?  If there was discussion, we want to be privy to this discussion; if there was no discussion, we want to know that there was no such discussion.  How do we accomplish this? 

 

Request for reasoning behind non-certification of AutoMark

 

REQUEST – May 12: Writings, including reasons and reasoning, as to why the Secretary of State denied certification to the AutoMark voting equipment.

 

RESPONSE – May 16: Below I am enclosing a letter from John Gardner, Voting Systems Specialist, to ES&S concerning their application for certification by the Colorado Secretary of State's office.

 

DISCUSSION - May 17:  The letter to ES&S gives the official "reason", but it is not responsive to our request for information regarding the "reasoning" behind why the AutoMark was denied certification.  We want to understand the reasoning and arguments behind why the AutoMark was denied certification because it does not meet Colorado Revised Statutes Title 1, Article 5 Section 704, specifically paragraph (1)(n)(I), yet the HART InterCivic eSlate was certified despite the fact that it does not meet the requirements of Colorado Revised Statutes Title 1, Article 5 Section 704, paragraphs (1)(n) I, IV, V and VI.  How do we accomplish this?

. 

 

Al Kolwicz

CAMBER – Citizens for Accurate Mail Ballot Election Results

2867 Tincup Circle

Boulder, CO 80305

303-494-1540

AlKolwicz@qwest.net

www.users.qwest.net/~alkolwicz

www.coloradovoter.blogspot.com

 

CAMBER is a dedicated group of volunteers who are working to ensure that every voter gets to vote once, every vote is counted once, and that every ballot is secure and anonymous.

 


CAMBER is a dedicated group of volunteers who are working to ensure that
every voter gets to vote once, every vote is counted once, and that every ballot is secure and anonymous.

Contact Al Kolwicz at 303-494-1540 or AlKolwicz@qwest.net