After attending most of the Hart Interactive voting machine session on 10/14, I would like to express a generally very positive impression of their voting system, but with two main qualifications, plus two questions.

1. The voting machine should be purchased as capable for all 4 main ballot types, especially the Ranked Vote type (IRV) application. Either the voting system should be delivered with this capability working, or have a contracted provision for installing all application types when & if requested by Election Commission owner. The future program installation fee needs to be specified and should be modestly low.

(Note that the Instant Run-off Voting machine capability could save much expense, if the 2nd ballot event for future run-off elections will someday be required. For example, the Denver Mayor race requires a run-off vote, (when applicable), so that they can reliably determine which candidate is supported by the majority of the voters.)

2. The paper ballot receipt for the Hart Interactive looks basically good, as the voter can (voluntarily) look thru a window to check their voting on the paper ballot receipt, which has also a anonymous serial number for each voter. However, this feature needs to be specified properly. I'd strongly recommend to require this official, original paper ballot receipt for each & every voter's record, along with a 2D bar code. Thus a scanned hand count could be done by scanning the bar codes quickly on the ballot receipts, which are probably contained conveniently on a long roll. The accuracy/reliability of the bar code can be ensured by sample-checking it sufficiently with the adjacent text on the ballot receipt. In addition, the accuracy/reliability of the digital voting record data in the memory cards can also be sample checked sufficiently by comparing it to the paper receipt voting record for the same serial number.

3. Question: Is there a significant danger of mailed absentee ballots being cleverly intercepted and fraudulently completed, (without detection)? Would it help to require the voters to sign their name and write in their SS# and then cross-check the SS#'s, if this could be made legally acceptable?

4. Question: Does the Provisional Ballot feature enable anyone who is a resident (but not on the voter registry) to vote provisionally? Is the provisional ballot later disqualified if the resident did not register to vote previously, or what grounds would the provisional ballot be rejected? For example, could the many thousands of unjustly disenfranchised voters in Florida in 2000 been able to vote provisionally and probably been approved later with this system, hypothetically? This does not appear to be a voting machine question, however.

Many thanks again for your all's good work,

JCBollinger

(as a concerned citizen)

----- Original Message -----

From: Bollinger

To: nwurl@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ; thalicki@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

Cc: calebk@xxxxxxxxxxxx

Sent: Tuesday, October 14, 2003 1:59 PM

Subject: Critical Requirements for new Voting Machines

Boulder County Election Commission and Citizens Committee for new voting machines:

Let me contribute a concise description of 4 critical requirements for new voting machines, to your process of specifying and deciding upon new voting machines for our Boulder County. I strongly believe, along with many others, that we must not purchase new voting machines, until we can specify them to the best standards.

Thank-you for your most valuable work,

John C. Bollinger, PE, CEM, 143 Salina St., Lafayette, CO 80026 303-666-7422

P.S.: The following is also attached in msWord along with additional letter by expert of Ctr. for Voting Democracy, to explain it in better detail.

Summary of 4 Critical Needs for new Voting Machines

Voting machines must be compatible with all four type of ballots.

a. If voting machines are not properly specified for all voting applications, then retrofit in the future will probably be prohibitively expensive. Often requiring a fully functional voting machine for all applications costs little or nothing extra, when specified properly before purchase. Whether or not one prefers to utilize all the ballot applications, there may very well be needs in the future to expand or improve our voting application types. We cannot afford to limit our future democratic choices, unnecessarily.

b. The four types of ballots are:

1. Single seat, plurality, which is the most common currently.

2. At Large seat, plurality, which is common for City Council elections.

3. Ranked Voting where the voter records his/her 1^st , 2^nd, etc. preferences for a single seat race. This includes Instant Run-off Voting and Choice Voting applications.

4. Cumulative Voting for At-Large races, where a citizen can make 1 or more votes for one or more candidates. This includes Proportional Voting applications.

2. The voting machine must produce a paper audit trail.

With the frequently proprietary internal code of digital voting machines, there is no method to 100% verify accuracy and to prevent tampering with the code and voting data. If the internal code were open source code, there would still be risks of tampering. Thus, paper ballot copies or receipts for each voter?s record needs to be produced and stored until election results are finalized and not contested. (In the past, corruption and fraud has been committed with voting processing in our country, such as with disenfranchising thousands of voters in Florida in 2000, and consequently opportunities for voting corruption must be minimized for our future.)

3. The voting machine must produce a digital Ballot Image of each voter?s record.

The Ballot Image is a multiple, redundant electronic digital recording of each voter?s voting record, which can also be produced to be read by the human eye. This requirement should apply to both Optical Scanning voting machines and to Touch Screen (DRE) voting machines. The main purposes are to independently back up the only digital copy of the voting records, to minimize the chance of having to do a hand count of paper ballots, and to enable Ranked Voting applications. Thus the voting machine will not just tally the votes electronically, but also provide a digital record of each voter?s votes.

4. The voting machine should be able to check the voter?s entry for over-votes and for under-votes, and give a specific warning to the voter, before finalizing vote entry.

The Optical Scanning voting machines should return the ballot to the voter if an over-vote is detected. The machine should give a warning to the voter if an under-vote is detected, to give an opportunity to complete un-voted items if voter chooses.

The Touch Screen voting machine should present a summary sheet of the voters decisions, so that the voter can verify correct entry, before finalizing the entry. (END: See Attachment)

Comments on Hart Interactive; Fw: Critical Requirements for new Voting Machines

Summary of 4 Critical Needs for new Voting Machines