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RE: Comments on Hart Interactive; Fw: Critical Requirements for new Voting Machines



Questions 3 & 4 are procedural ones that I can answer.

 

In both cases, under both HAVA and state laws, the voter must provide a signature and some kind of ID (the list is on the back of the new voter registration forms).

Whether provisional or mail-in, the signature of the voter is on the outside of the envelope. So if the voter is found not to be authentic, or another ballot for them turns up, it gets denied. Bad ballots are never opened, and that has always been true.

 

Provisional ballots can be taken or submitted anywhere. The polling place, the clerk’s office, or by mail. A lot of research goes into a provisional to make sure that the voter can vote, before the ballot packet is opened.

I believe that there have been people who have voted provisionally in an attempt to vote in more than one jurisdiction. Diligent work by people who care makes the difference. Technology helps, but election workers have to care to bother to use it. In Boulder they do, in Montrose they don’t. it is the three rules of real estate brokerage: location, location, location. Boulder cares, other places may not give a rat’s ass.

 

In 2004 all of the voter registration records will be on-line with the state (SoS), not the counties. There are pros and cons. One of the pros will be that the clerk in Pitkin (Aspen) will be able to tell if a voter voted in Boulder as well. This can’t be done now. Is this happening? You bet.

When I was last in Aspen I met a man who told me that he votes in Kansas and in Colorado. HAVA isn’t just about boxes and blinky lights, it is about procedures that will be enforced everywhere. Or maybe not …

 

Paul Tiger

 

 

 

-----Original Message-----
From: Bollinger [mailto:bolo@xxxxxxxxxxxx]
Sent: Tuesday, October 14, 2003 9:27 PM
To: nwurl@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx; thalicki@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx; jpezzillo@xxxxxxxxx; bcv@xxxxxxxxxxx
Subject: Comments on Hart Interactive; Fw: Critical Requirements for new Voting Machines

 

After attending most of the Hart Interactive voting machine session on 10/14, I would like to express a generally very positive impression of their voting system, but with two main qualifications, plus two questions.

1.  The voting machine should be purchased as capable for all 4 main ballot types, especially the Ranked Vote type (IRV) application.  Either the voting system should be delivered with this capability working, or have a contracted provision for installing all application types when & if requested by Election Commission owner.  The future program installation fee needs to be specified and should be modestly low. 

(Note that the Instant Run-off Voting machine capability could save much expense, if the 2nd ballot event for future run-off elections will someday be required.  For example, the Denver Mayor race requires a run-off vote, (when applicable), so that they can reliably determine which candidate is supported by the majority of the voters.)

 

2.  The paper ballot receipt for the Hart Interactive looks basically good, as the voter can (voluntarily) look thru a window to check their voting on the paper ballot receipt, which has also a anonymous serial number for each voter.  However, this feature needs to be specified properly.  I'd strongly recommend to require this official, original paper ballot receipt for each & every voter's record, along with a 2D bar code.  Thus a scanned hand count could be done by scanning the bar codes quickly on the ballot receipts, which are probably contained conveniently on a long roll.   The accuracy/reliability of the bar code can be ensured by sample-checking it sufficiently with the adjacent text on the ballot receipt.  In addition, the accuracy/reliability of the digital voting record data in the memory cards can also be sample checked sufficiently by comparing it to the paper receipt voting record for the same serial number.

 

3.  Question:   Is there a significant danger of mailed absentee ballots being cleverly intercepted and fraudulently completed, (without detection)?  Would it help to require the voters to sign their name and write in their SS# and then cross-check the SS#'s, if this could be made legally acceptable?

 

4.  Question:   Does the Provisional Ballot feature enable anyone who is a resident (but not on the voter registry) to vote provisionally?   Is the provisional ballot later disqualified if the resident did not register to vote previously, or what grounds would the provisional ballot be rejected?   For example, could the many thousands of unjustly disenfranchised voters in Florida in 2000 been able to vote provisionally and probably been approved later with this system, hypothetically?   This does not appear to be a voting machine question, however.

 

Many thanks again for your all's good work,

JCBollinger 

(as a concerned citizen)

 

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