Voter Confidence Act - HR 2239 summary

[Neal McBurnett <neal@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

I think HR2239, the proposed The Voter Confidence and Increased
Accessibility Act of 2003, is one of the most important resources we
have.  Since a number of people hadn't looked at it yet, I'm posting
the arguments for it and the summary by the author here.

It requires paper for recounts, disclosure of software, and mandatory
recounts - right down our line!  Doing this at the federal level
would be much better.

I urge you to call Udall and Beauprez (who has indicated some interest
in such things) and other Colorado legislators soon to support it
before the session ends (soon!).

Udall: 202-225-2161 or 303-650-7820 
Beauprez: 202-225-2645 or 303-940-5821

See also the status and cosponsers of "HR 2239" at http://thomas.loc.gov/

Cheers,

Neal McBurnett                 http://bcn.boulder.co.us/~neal/
Signed and/or sealed mail encouraged.  GPG/PGP Keyid: 2C9EBA60

This is the text of http://holt.house.gov/issues2.cfm?id=5996

ON ELECTION DAY 2004, HOW WILL YOU KNOW IF YOUR VOTE IS PROPERLY COUNTED? 
			  ANSWER:  YOU WONT

 Rep. Rush Holt Introduces Legislation to Require All Voting Machines
	      To Produce A Voter-Verified Paper Trail  

Washington, DC Rep. Rush Holt today responded to the growing chorus of
concern from election reform specialists and computer security experts
about the integrity of future elections by introducing reform
legislation, The Voter Confidence and Increased Accessibility Act of
2003. The measure would require all voting machines to produce an
actual paper record by 2004 that voters can view to check the accuracy
of their votes and that election officials can use to verify votes in
the event of a computer malfunction, hacking, or other irregularity.
Experts often refer to this paper record as a voter-verified paper
trail.

We cannot afford nor can we permit another major assault on the
integrity of the American electoral process, said Rep. Rush Holt.
Imagine its Election Day 2004. You enter your local polling place and
go to cast your vote on a brand new touch screen voting machine. The
screen says your vote has been counted.  As you exit the voting booth,
however, you begin to wonder.  How do I know if the machine actually
recorded my vote?  The fact is, you dont.

Last October, Congress passed the Help America Vote Act (HAVA),
groundbreaking election reform legislation that is currently helping
states throughout the country replace antiquated and unreliable punch
card and butterfly ballot voting systems.  HAVA, however, is having an
unintended consequence.  It is fueling a rush by states and localities
to purchase computer-voting systems that suffer from a serious flaw;
voters and election officials have no way of knowing whether the
computers are counting votes properly.  Hundreds of nationally
renowned computer scientists, including internationally renowned
expert David Dill of Stanford University, consider a voter-verified
paper trial to be a critical safeguard for the accuracy, integrity and
security of computer-assisted elections.

Voting should not be an act of blind faith.  It should be an act of
record, said Rep Rush Holt. But current law does nothing to protect
the integrity of our elections against computer malfunction, computer
hackers, or any other potential irregularities.

There have already been several examples of computer error in
elections.  In the 2002 election, brand new computer voting systems
used in Florida lost over 100,000 votes due to a software error.
Errors and irregularities were also reported in New Jersey, Missouri,
Georgia, Texas, and at least 10 other states.

A recount requires that there be a reliable record to check, said
Holt.  Without an actual paper record that each voter can
confidentially inspect, faulty or hacked computer systems will simply
spit out the same faulty or hacked result.  Every vote in every
election matters. We can and should do this in time for the 2004
federal election.

Key provisions of The Voter Confidence and Increased Accessibility Act
of 2003 include:

1)      Requires all voting systems to produce a voter-verified paper
record for use in manual audits and recounts.  For those using the
increasingly popular ATM-like DRE(Direct Recording Electronic)
machines, this requirement means the DRE would print a receipt that
each voter would verify as accurate and deposit into a lockbox for
later use in a recount.  States would have until November 2003 to
request additional funds to meet this requirement.

2)      Bans the use of undisclosed software and wireless
communications devices in voting systems.

3)      Requires all voting systems to meet these requirements in time
for the general election in November 2004.  Jurisdictions that feel
their new computer systems may not be able to meet this deadline may
use an existing paper system as an interim measure (at federal
expense) in the November 2004 election.

4)      Requires that electronic voting system be provided for persons
with disabilities by January 1, 2006 -- one year earlier than
currently required by HAVA.  Like the voting machines for non-disabled
voters, those used by disabled voters must also provide a mechanism
for voter-verification, though not necessarily a paper trail.
Jurisdictions unable to meet this requirement by the deadline must
give disabled voters the option to use the interim paper system with
the assistance of an aide of their choosing.

5)      Requires mandatory surprise recounts in 0.5% of domestic
jurisdictions and 0.5% of overseas jurisdictions.