[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]
RE: Avante Letter to Colorado Daily
AVANTE produces a system which can produce paper that is not voter-verified
balloting, but rather after-the-fact printout.
Since there is not certification standard for voter-verifiable equipment,
AVANTE is confusing the portion of its equipment that is certified (DRE)
with the portion that has no certification (voter-verified printout).
So, when Kevin asserted,
> "Therefore, the discussion and
> concern that no voting system with voter verifiable paper record
> satisfies both the Federal and State law is erroneous.
... it is HE who is erroneous, in the sense that, since there is no federal
or state law governing voter-verifiable paper ballots, how can there be any
equipment in compliance?
Also, according to Dr. Rebecca Mercuri:
"""
I had visited the Avante offices a few weeks prior to the November election
with a colleague and complained vigorously that the machines as implemented
were NOT voter verified paper balloting systems. The machines specifically
do NOT give the voter an opportunity to CONFIRM that the ballot that they
are shown has been correctly prepared. The voter has only the option of
ending the balloting session, and NOT an option of rejecting the printed
ballot because it is in error. If the voter hesitates (say to go outside of
the booth to complain that the printed ballot is not how they intended to
vote) the ballot gets sucked away and cast for them anyway. This happened
when we were in the offices. (I can tell you that I was shocked and
exclaimed something like "what's going on here?") I explained in some great
detail at their offices, and also with a follow-up in writing, that this
sequence of events makes the Avante machine NOT a voter verified system
because the voter does not have the opportunity to VERIFY (through the
deliberate act of casting) their ballot.
What I am annoyed by is the continual co-opting of the concept of voter
verification to mean just about anything other than what it was intended to
be as Peter Neumann and I have explained it. What the Connecticut situation
illustrates is not that VVPB is problematic, but that the Avante
implementation is NOT VVPB.
I hope that this is NOT subtle and that everyone understands what I am
saying here. If not, please ask me and I will explain it further.
Rebecca Mercuri.
"""
... and ...
"""
The Avante system is certified in 14 states, California being one. Current
voting system certification can not attest to whether a product is "voter
verified" or not since there presently is no aspect of certification that
would determine that. The mere addition of paper to a system (even if the
voter gets to see it during ballot preparation) does not make a system voter
verified, as demonstrated by Avante's currently incorrect implementation of
the paper ballot feature. It is my understanding that they have a mode that
would make the system voter verified, but this apparently was not what was
used in the November Connecticut election.
Rebecca Mercuri.
"""
--
Pete Klammer / ACM(1970), IEEE, ICCP(CCP), NSPE(PE), NACSE(NSNE)
3200 Routt Street / Wheat Ridge, Colorado 80033-5452
(303)233-9485 / Fax:(303)274-6182 / Mailto:PKlammer@xxxxxxx
Idealism may not win every contest, but that's not what I choose it for!
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Mcgrath, Bob___PI_Mkt [mailto:bob.mcgrath@xxxxxxxxxx]
> Sent: Friday, December 19, 2003 3:49 PM
> To: 'pklammer@xxxxxxx'; 'mlambie@xxxxxxxxx'
> Subject: FW: Avante Letter to Colorado Daily
>
>
> Hmmmm
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Joe Pezzillo [mailto:jpezzillo@xxxxxxxxx]
> Sent: Friday, December 19, 2003 3:41 PM
> To: bcv@xxxxxxxxxxx
> Cc: Bob___PI_Mkt Mcgrath; valenty@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx;
> johnbyrneait@xxxxxxx
> Subject: Avante Letter to Colorado Daily
>
>
>
> This is the Avante response to the Colorado Daily article of 12/12
> which quoted Neil McClure, and was sent to me by John Byrne of Avante
> who confirmed I could share it with the list.
>
> I converted it to plain text for the list, so please blame any
> formatting errors on me.
>
> Look for it in print!
>
> Joe
>
> ----------
>
>
> My name is Kevin Chung; the CEO of AVANTE International Technology,
> Inc. AVANTE is one of the four vendors currently in
> contention for the
> Boulder voting system. I would like to help clarify some of
> the issues
> and concerns in the article "County to vote on voting system
> finalist"
> on December 12 Colorado Daily.
>
> AVANTE is the pioneer of the touch-screen voting system
> with voter
> verifiable paper record and audit trail. AVANTE VOTE-TRAKKERT voting
> system is currently certified by both Federal NASED and SOS of
> Colorado. The system had been used in elections successfully in the
> State of California and Connecticut. Therefore, the discussion and
> concern that no voting system with voter verifiable paper record
> satisfies both the Federal and State law is erroneous.
>
> ".under state law, a recount must be conducted on the
> same media on
> which the original vote is cast..."
>
> To really interpret the aspect of recount, we have to examine two of
> the current election statutes. Colorado statute "1-5-601- Use
> of voting
> machines or electronic voting systems" states "In all
> elections held in
> this State, the votes may be cast, registered, recorded, and
> counted by
> means of a voting machine or by means of an electronic voting system,
> consisting of a ballot which is marked by the elector and counted by
> electronic vote-counting equipment or counted by electronic voting
> equipment on which votes are recorded simultaneously on a paper tape
> and a removable "prom" or other electronic tabulation device
> or a vote
> recorder which the elector uses to record each vote on a ballot card
> and the vote-counting equipment, as provided in this part 6."
>
> That is, current state law requires multiple media and one of
> them must
> be paper tape.
>
> The recount statute is outlined in 1-10.5-110 (3) and (4). "All
> recounts of votes cast on direct record electronic voting machines
> shall be conducted using electronic ballot images. As used in this
> section, "ballot image" means a record of each vote cast by a voter
> that is stored on a removal memory device contained in such voting
> machine. All ballot images shall be randomized in such voting machine
> to assure voter anonymity." Ballot images in the election industry
> means direct print out of each of the ballots as cast. Recount is
> normally done manually by reading these printed ballot images. Since
> the ballot images have already been printed as paper tapes or paper
> records, one would assume that the recount be performed on such paper
> tapes or records.
>
> More importantly, the Federal HAVA law requires that all recounts be
> done using the paper records (paper tape in Colorado State Statute).
>
> There was an interesting quote in the article from Mr.
> Neil McClure
> of
> Hart InterCivic: "Since when did paper become a tamper-proof media? I
> could print ballots on my $175 home printer that would look like real
> ballots". AVANTE being the pioneer of this type of technology, has
> posted a white paper on HYPERLINK "http://www.vote-trakker.com";
> www.vote-trakker.com titled "A manufacturer's View Point On the Voter
> Verifiable Paper Record and Audit Trail". There is a section that
> answers this simple question.
>
> The paper record produced by the proven VOTE-TRAKKERT voting
> system not
> only has a unique random generated tracking number, it also has an
> encrypted relational check code binding the selections with the
> tracking number. More importantly, the paper record produced
> by AVANTE
> VOTE-TRAKKERT also has a relational encryption printed on the paper
> record. AVANTE challenges anyone to duplicate or simulate
> such a paper
> record.
>
>
>
> Sincerely yours,
>
> Kevin Chung, Ph.D., CEO, AVANTE International Technology, Inc.
>
>