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League of Women Voters OPPOSES Verified Voting
Happy Holidays!
Another group against Voter Verifiable paper ballots.
Begin Forwarded Message:
It bears noting that the American Association of People with
Disabilities (AAPD), League of Women Voters, Leadership Conference on
Civil Rights and a number of groups that have been stalwarts in
promoting voters rights are adamantly opposed to voter verified
ballots. To see why so many voting rights groups are opposed, I am
posting AAPD's statement of opposition to voter verified ballots and
linking to their page with more detailed information on the subject.
-------------------------------
AAPD Policy Statement on Voter Verified Paper Ballots
http://www.aapd-dc.org/dvpmain/elreform/aapdballots.html
The 2002 Help America Vote Act (HAVA) made several important and
large-scale improvements to the nation's elections system,
particularly in regard to the accessibility of the voting process for
people with disabilities. A significant part of the bill is the
requirement to place an accessible voting machine in every polling
place in the country by January of 2006. This technology will allow
millions of voters with disabilities to cast a secret and independent
ballot-many of them doing so for the first time in their lives.
There are, however, efforts that threaten this positive impact and
will certainly delay implementation by many years. The most dangerous
and costly of these initiatives is the voter verifiable paper ballots
(VVPB), already part of state law in Illinois and New Hampshire.
The clique of VVPB supporters disputes the fact that touch screen
voting machines are safe, secure, and reliable. They theorize that it
is likely that computerized voting systems will accidentally miscount
the ballots or that a rogue programmer will steal an election.
Therefore, every touch screen must be attached to a printer and give
the voter a paper ballot. If implemented in state initiatives, VVPB
will violate the letter and spirit of HAVA by once again denying
people with disabilities their right to a secret and independent
vote. Not only will the rights of people with disabilities be
stripped, but the costs of local elections will rise significantly
with no promise or guarantee of future federal funding to absorb
these new costs.
The American Association of People with Disabilities (AAPD) opposes
VVPB for four primary reasons:
*It does not substantially address the issue of election fraud.
*It violates the accessibility requirements under HAVA.
*It will raise the costs of local elections and threaten Title III
funding.
*Touch screen voting systems that provide a VVPB do not exist, have
not been tested in the real world, and are not certified.
1) VVPB AND ELECTION FRAUD
Since 1964, electronic voting systems have been used in this nation's
elections processes. In almost four decades, not a single case of
election fraud due to the tampering of a system's hardware or
software has occurred. Comparably, in the last 40 years, hundreds of
cases of election fraud involving paper have occurred and been
successfully prosecuted.
Dr. Michael Shamos, a noted expert with twenty years experience in
testing and certifying voting systems points out: "So-called voter-
verifiable ballot systems are nothing of the kind. They simply
replace electronic voting, which has a perfect security record, with
a paper medium, which is easy to tamper with."
In order to commit election fraud using a paper system, a perpetrator
only needs to know how the elections process works. If a perpetrator
were to attempt fraud with a direct response election (DRE), that
individual would need to know not only how elections work, but must
also possess highly sophisticated technical knowledge and have
undetected access to the system on election day.
Touch screen voting machines are now required to have a paper trail.
The voters' selection is stored in multiple locations immediately
after being cast.
Touch screen voting computers and the election day software are not
available online.
Each voting machine has its own software.
An individual DRE will handle approximately two to three hundred
votes.
Election procedures provide multiple cross checks and access to the
machines and software is guarded like Fort Knox.
2) ACCESSIBILITY VIOLATIONS
AAPD and the disability community are in favor of a voter having the
ability to verify the accuracy of their vote and to change any vote
before their ballot is cast. In fact, it is one of the reasons the
disability community has so strongly supported the implementation of
DRE's that verify ballots and inform voters of a miss-vote.
By requiring verification of a paper ballot before casting a ballot,
blind voters are denied access to a secret and independent
verification of their ballot. This action violates the letter and
spirit of HAVA according to section 301, subsection (A) which states,
"?the voting system shall
(i) permit the voter to verify (in a private and independent manner)
the votes selected by the voter on the ballot before the ballot is
cast and counted."
People with upper mobility disabilities or limitations are denied
equal access to casting an independent vote if a paper ballot must be
put into a ballot box. This also is a clear violation of HAVA's
intent.
HAVA requires that all DRE's produce a paper audit trail. This audit
trail is the most accurate and efficient way for an election
authority to ensure that the systems are operating correctly.
3) THE COST OF VVPB
There is no question that the printing of paper ballots will
significantly raise the costs associated with DRE's and elections.
This cost was not intended or foreseen by HAVA.
Requiring a VVPB will result in federal funds being diverted to the
costs of printing paper ballots. This will, in many cases, eliminate
the possibility of buying accessible DRE's.
The additional cost of paper systems will prevent federal funds from
being used for poll worker recruitment and training. Miami, in 2002,
used touch screen computers for the first time. In the primary, poll
workers and voters were not properly trained on how to use the touch
screens, resulting in a primary day mess. For the general election,
Miami had to use city employees who were properly trained and the
election went smoothly, but it cost the county more than a million
dollars to use its employees.
Local jurisdictions and states will ultimately shoulder the
additional ongoing costs of VVPB. Since localities and states are the
least-funded government entities, the result of VVPB on elections
could be highly detrimental.
In addition to these factors, there is also the concern that none of
the DRE systems certified by the Federal Election Commission (FEC)
specifically for HAVA funds have the capacity to produce a paper
ballot. At best, the mandating of VVPB puts election authorities at
risk of implementing systems that may be redundant and unnecessary.
At worst, this requirement is an assault on the intention of HAVA,
and it puts our democracy at risk because of the inaccuracies,
unreliability and discriminatory practices. AAPD cannot in good faith
support a measure that will negate the accessibility requirements
under HAVA and one that creates an unfunded mandate for local
election authorities.
Those who are calling for a voter verified paper ballot have already
succeeded in delaying the purchase of accessible voting equipment in
several counties in California and the states of Illinois and New
Hampshire.
For additional information, see:
http://www.aapd-dc.org/dvpmain/votemachines/paperballots.html