Nick,
In a perfect world, we would be able to solely examine machine
performance and judge it upon its results. Because we do not know and
cannot visually see and verify how the machine is actually
"recognizing" and recording and then converting that recorded image
into a digital version for later tabulation, and then again not being
able to visually audit that that tabulation process is not open to
errors, all we can judge the machine by is their results.
In Wake County, North Carolina, an ES&S machine that was tested (put
thru the wringer of "logic and accuracy tests") and then certified as
good to go still dropped 400+ votes and it was only noticed because it
happened during early voting and not under the pressures of election
day itself. Yet in a test against a paper alternative, the machine
would come out fine.
As our friend Al Kolwicz points out, so much more than just results
matter. It is the conditions of the election event (not just election
day but also the handling of all processes leading up to the election)
that can or do affect performance of election systems. It is possible
for someone intent on "fixing" or rigging a race to tamper with
machines just as much as it is to tamper with the old lever machines
or to plan to "lose" a ballot box of paper. The entirety of the
process, from preparation to oversight to execution to follow-up, all
matter in examining the integrity of the voting process. It is
possible that the warehousing function allows knowledgeable employees
to alter or insert new instructions into software or into memory
cards. It is possible that vendors could be allowed to insert
last-minute software version "updates" at polling places, unknown to
county administrators and conceivably reasonable to the unaware
election judge volunteer who might think this is business as usual.
You are correct that the null hypothesis may be the more proper
approach to take (i.e., prove that the machines DO work instead of
that they DON'T work) but it remains only one piece of voting
integrity. I agree that paper receipts provide the means by which to
perform a meaningful recount, but with Colorado law prohibiting
non-identical methods of counting/recounting, we would NEVER LOOK AT
THE PAPER IN THE FIRST PLACE.
Colorado needs to remove this law from the books. But we also need to
reclaim the paper balllot method as the supremely verifiable process
in elections, and have those paper ballots be the medium that is
itself counted and treated with the full force of law that already
exists to protect balllots.
Bob McGrath
Director, Coloradoans for Verified Voting
www.cfvi.org
From: Nicholas Bernstein <nicholas.bernstein@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
To: Robert Mcgrath <mcgrath_mcnally@xxxxxxx>
CC: evan@xxxxxxxx, cmehesy@xxxxxxxxxxx, davide475@xxxxxxxx,
david.ellington@xxxxxxxxxxx, summerstorm03@xxxxxxxxxxx,
donna@xxxxxxxxxxxx, jpezzillo@xxxxxxxxx, mlambie@xxxxxxxxx,
texico86@xxxxxxx, peter.raich@xxxxxxxx, TresCeeA@xxxxxxx,
pklammer@xxxxxxx, AlKolwicz@xxxxxxxxx, cvv-discuss@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Subject: Null Hypothesis
Date: Fri, 16 Apr 2004 11:08:13 -0600
Bob,
I think you've hit upon a very trenchant issue. I would repose it
like this, "In looking at electronic voting systems, who has the
burden of proof? Is it up to proponents of electronic voting to prove
the superiority of electronic systems, or the detractors to prove the
fallibility?"
Proponents say, "Just look at Florida in 2000. Paper doesn't work!"
Detractors say, "Just look at the security holes in Deibold machines.
Electronics can't be trusted!"
I would claim that they are both right. Neither method should be
trusted based solely on the failures of the other. The only way to
reliablilty compare the two is to have them go head-to-head. And the
only way to do this is with a paper printout.
Call it a "ballot" or a "receipt". The difference is moot. Until one
system has proven its superiority over the other, there should be a
complete count of paper and electronic ballots. If a unique ballot ID
can link the two, anomolies can be investigated on a case by case basis.
There are those people who are afraid of such a head-to-head
comparisons because they worry that the electronic count will trump
the paper one. I think the question of which method should be trusted
in case of anomolies is minor compared to coming up with a measure of
the relative accuracy. If we get nothing else, we learn that there is
an x% discrepancy rate. That, in itself, is very valuable.
If we really want to unambiguously resolve discrepancies, then we
need a method for letting the voters themselves resolve them. I have
proposed variations on this theme before, but here is another try. At
the voting place, a SECOND RECEIPT is printed that contains ONLY THE
UNIQUE ID. The user can take that home. Discrepant ballot IDs are
posted. If your ballot is one of those in question, your second
receipt provides you admission to a session where you can cast a
clarification ballot. Obviously there are many details to work out,
but this system would maintain anonymity, guard against miscounts,
and let voters know when their ballot has been invalidated.
Nick
--
If you're not outraged, you're not paying attention.
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