Bev Harris: A simple way to make computer voting safer

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http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/opinion/2001918663_bevharris04.html

A simple way to make computer voting safer

By Bev Harris
Special to The Times
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Paperless touch-screen voting systems have triggered a
controversy ? invisible ballot systems may represent
the biggest bamboozling in the history of voting. But
even if we make vapor-ballot systems disappear,
problems with computerized vote-counting will remain.

If we are going to use any form of computerized
vote-tallying, we need to implement procedures to
mitigate risks. One of the most important procedures,
after a voter-verified paper ballot for auditing, is
to post polling-place results.

In America, casting a vote is a private matter. The
counting of the vote, however, has always been (and
should remain) a public matter.

When we shifted from neighborhood-based to centralized
counting, fewer eyes watched our votes. Then we
privatized vote-counting altogether: Even when you
vote on paper, your vote is counted by a computer,
programmed by a private company, and your paper ballot
is hardly ever examined. Instead, a computer
interprets your vote. Our county officials are
prohibited from examining the source code these
computers use, and it is the source code that tells
the computer how to count your vote.

Even Washington's secretary of state does not examine
source code. Nor does the state elections director.
Instead, everyone in Washington relies on a small
Alabama branch office of Ciber, Inc., where a
motorcycle enthusiast named Shawn Southworth examines
the source code.

Rather than direct examination, state and local
officials rely on a ballot-sampling procedure called
the "logic and accuracy" (L&A) test, saying it proves
the machines count accurately. But we now know that at
least 100 elections have been miscounted by these
computers despite L&A tests.

Following a blistering report from Johns Hopkins and
Rice university researchers, Maryland and Ohio
commissioned independent studies of Diebold's software
and found it to be riddled with problems. This
software is used in King, Chelan, San Juan and
Klickitat counties in our state.

Ohio commissioned an independent study of Sequoia's
system, which found several critical security flaws.
Sequoia's central tally software, it turns out, is
even easier to tamper with than Diebold's. Sequoia is
used in Snohomish County.

Diebold announced that it fixed the flaws, but it
turns out that they were not corrected: A document
called "release notes" details each change made in
upgraded software, and Diebold's release notes for the
system used in King County show that the flaws weren't
corrected. A second report commissioned by the state
of Maryland confirms that flaws still exist.

Sequoia has promised to correct its flaws, but has yet
to provide any release notes to show that it has done
so.

Computer enthusiasts can now verify these flaws for
themselves. The Diebold central tally program is
posted on a Web site run by California computer
programmer Jim March, and the Sequoia program is now
available on BlackBoxVoting.org.

Here's a simple remedy: Post the polling-place tallies
in public, before the electronic votes are sent to
central count, and match polling-place reports with
the central count. Amazingly, Washington state does
not require this, but county officials have the
authority to do so, and we should demand it.

We vote at local polling places. Our votes are
collected on electronic "ballot boxes," in the form of
memory cards and cartridges. The information on these
electronic ballot boxes is transferred to the county's
central tally program. If someone switches the
electronic ballot box (about the size of a credit
card), or takes advantage of tamper-friendly features
in the central tally programs, your vote can easily be
changed.

Posting the polling-place tapes will be quick, easy
and cheap. Diebold machines have an internal printer.
Sequoia touch-screen machines have a port to which a
printer can be attached. Both systems can print
results at the polling place. This takes about 60
seconds and costs almost nothing.

Elections officials say that polling-place tallies
won't match central tallies because they like to mix
in other kinds of votes at central count, like
absentee, provisional or challenge ballots. But
vote-counting is just bookkeeping. If election
officials comingle the data, they need to correct
their bookkeeping procedures.

In Washington, we spot-check results. But Diebold's
program has a specific flaw that survives spot checks
even when the totals are wrong: Diebold's tally system
uses two different sets of books ? which don't have to
match. In Sequoia's program, you can paste in
vote-shaving code that will pass a spot-check while
changing totals.

Some states, like Alabama, already require
polling-place tapes. California Secretary of State
Kevin Shelley has also directed counties to post
polling-place tapes. We should insist on polling-place
printouts in Washington state.

Bev Harris, based in Renton, runs BlackBoxVoting.org,
a national watchdog group that promotes auditable and
secure voting. She can be reached at
BevHarrismail@xxxxxxxx Harris is the author of "Black
Box Voting: Ballot-Tampering in the 21st Century"
(Talion Publishing). 


	
		
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