Without verification, elections should not be trusted. "Trust but verify"

Below is our testimony to the EAC.

May 3, 2004

DeForest B. Soaries, Jr., Chairman

Gracia Hillman

Paul DeGregorio

Raymundo Martinez III

U.S. Election Assistance Commission

1225 New York Ave. NW – Suite 1100

Washington, DC 20005

Dear Commission Members:

Without verification, elections should not be trusted. Mistakes and manipulation must be open to public scrutiny.

Every voter must have the opportunity to verify that their vote is recorded correctly. The public must have the opportunity to verify that all verified votes are kept secure and correctly interpreted and counted. Colorado’s Senate unanimously agrees; see “SJR 04-010 concerning paperless voting systems”.

DRE voting equipment vendors have proposed a “cheap fix” – (1) add a printer to the DRE and let voters verify what is recorded on the paper, and (2) recount the votes on the paper if there is a need.

Adding an audit-trail-receipt printer to DRE voting equipment does not eliminate distrust or meet the requirements for secure, verifiable, and accurate elections. Consider the following:

With more than one official record, how would a discrepancy be resolved between an electronic vote and the corresponding vote on a receipt? Would the election be voided?

Voters would not be able to verify the votes that actually decide most elections -- the electronic votes. Voters would be restricted to verifying votes on receipts that usually won’t matter.

A list of one-line summaries is not sufficient for voters to accurately recall and verify their votes (e.g. AMENDMENT 14A – YES). Full-ballot-text is required for verification.

Votes on receipts would rarely be counted. They would only be counted for a recount.

Vote summaries on slips of cut roll-paper would be prohibitively expensive to count/recount. High costs would reduce the likelihood that a campaign would request a recount.

Even if the votes were verifiable, DRE voting equipment makes it impossible for the public to verify that electronic votes are kept secure and that they are correctly interpreted and counted. There is no tangible basis for trust.

Absentee voters use paper ballots. Two incompatible systems would be needed to count votes -- the verifiable paper-vote-counting-system for absentee votes, and a non-verifiable electronic-vote-counting-system for in-person votes. This means more complexity and less trust.

Voter verifiable voting solutions exist. For example, AUTOMARK from Vogue Election Systems meets HAVA requirements for disabled voting and records votes on full-ballot-text paper ballots. Publicly verifiable vote interpretation and counting solutions also exist.

We understand that you will consider this topic on May 5^th and volunteer to do whatever we can to ensure that you understand these requirements and options.

We are citizen volunteers. We’re not selling products or services. Our interest is strictly Trustworthy Elections.

The United States deserves a voting system that can be completely trusted – one based on verified votes and verified counts.

Thank you very much for receiving our comments.

Al Kolwicz

Executive Director

CAMBER

Citizens for Accurate Mail Ballot Election Results

2867 Tincup Circle

Boulder, CO 80305

303-494-1540

AlKolwicz@xxxxxxxxx

www.users.qwest.net/~alkolwicz

http://coloradovoter.blogspot.com