I thought that y’all might like to have these questions on
hand should you come tomorrow. I believe that they were delivered to Hart this
morning. Whatever the case, by 1pm tomorrow they will be part of the record.
the leak …<{;^)
<><><><><
- Does Hart have a specification for the image
needed to assure ballots can be read by the combination scanner and Hart
software? Resolution? Contrast? Orthogonality? Other?
- Should the county be giving the printer C4
TIFF files instead of the Hart software output (postscript)?
- Is the option box created by Hart converted to
a TTF and then added or assigned an existing Font #? Could the county have the names
and origins of the barcode and text fonts?
- How are the voting areas identified in the
Hart Software? We have heard that the scanner / software finds the
barcodes, establishes x,y coordinates, scales x and y, and distorts from
Orthogonal to a best fit? What part of the barcode represents the
datum?
- Are the barcodes’ position part of the
“flagging” of damaged ballots?
Is the distance between barcodes a figure of merit for accepting a
ballot at the scanner?
- How far off from the expected position can the
barcodes exist and still be interpreted? How clean does a bar code
edge need to be to be interpreted.
- How far off from the expected position can the
vote squares exist and still be recognized? If the area of the ballot away
from the barcodes is damaged or deformed, would the integrated
scanner/software know this prior to capture? Does Hart have experience in discovery of printing
distortions other than in the margins?
- Has Hart characterized the stability, bias,
linearity, repeatablity and reproducability scanner to scanner, time to
time for the system software/hardware combination? Has this been
done through the expected operating dimensions and distortions anticipated
in the ballot environment? Has this been published? May we see the
data? How does this vary with the size of the ballot?
- Does Hart distribute Kodak scanners? Do they represent any other
scanner manufacturer? Why
were Kodak technicians on hand during the tally process?
Software
- Can Hart prepare software to allow a prescreen
at the printer contractor?
All ballots should return an undervote.
- Are the barcodes interpreted at the scanner or
in the NT computer? How much
of the process is resident at the scanner and how much is in the tallying
computer? Could you prepare a
flow chart to explain it?
- Can the software be modified to look for marks
outside the squares in a undervote interpretation, perhaps in a donut
around the option box?
- Can additional fiducials be added nearer the
option boxes to allow a second interpretation of a scan when an avacado
(damaged race) is indicated on the first interpretation? Can a cross
or other fiducial be used nearer the option boxes instead of using the
perimeter bar codes as location devices?
- Can the ballots be sorted during the scanning
process - countable ballots in one pile and ballots requiring resolution
in a second pile? The reason to ask this is to use a high speed
process to interpret all ballots that can be interpreted quickly and take
those requiring resolution off line to a "rework process" which
is slower. As it is now, the scanner is idle as soon as a batch of
ballots has damaged ballots identified. What hardware/software
changes would be necessary to accomplish this mission? Is a reject tray
available?
- Can the ballots be interpreted out of
order? Missing pages?
- Can the Hart software allow a batch of ballots
(say a stack of 500 in a scanner) be pulled for a hand count audit?
In order for this to have validity, could a printed count (or data base
record) for that stack be produced for comparison? Can an individual custom report be
prepared?
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