RE: Secret ballot and the Colorado constitution

["Some Guy" <someguy@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

Watermarks are crap. They can be reproduced. If not with a modern
photocopier, then with a scanner.

While it might be possible to notice a reproduced watermark or copied
ballot, the fraud is NEVER noticed until after the ballots are in the works.

If the ballot arrive without serialization or some kind of unique
identifier, then they are all vanilla. If unique identifiers are imprinted
when the ballots are being scanned, then we've added insult to injury by
including them in the ballot run.
I'm not think and writing clearly this morning. I mean that the ballots
would not only be allowed but be validated as real ballots by imprinting
them after being cast.

While the constitution says no markings, I am clear that there needs to be
marking and the computers need to know what was printed and issued.
The database of serial numbers could tell us that 'yes' the number in
question is a valid number, but could it tell us what ballots were actually
given to voters and what ones are still in a pile on a pallet in storage? In
order to know what ballots had been issued the clerk would have to keep
track of them.
Then we come full circle to the real issue. Can a unique identifier be
tracked back to a particular voter.

Once again - I make the statement that everyone here seems to hate:
I don't give a rat's ass who knows how I voted. If you ask me I will tell
you, if I can remember.

Before the end of the civil war voting was not secret. I believe that the US
made a wrong turn in making ballots secret. My opinion appears to be in the
minority, but that is still my opinion.

Paul Tiger

-----Original Message-----
From: Paul E Condon [mailto:pecondon@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx]
Sent: Monday, February 27, 2006 10:06 PM
To: cvv-discuss@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Subject: Re: Secret ballot and the Colorado constitution

No ID marks until the moment of scanning was Paul W.'s idea intended
to address the problem of some spy-ware or some hidden cameras getting
information that could be used to associate a particular marked ballot
with a particular voter. Maybe these problems need to be addressed in
some other way. Perhaps, we can:

1) Discourage hidden cameras and other non-computer spy techniques by
application of traditional techniques of physical security, the kind
of stuff that security guards are trained to do. Use State Troopers, etc.

2) Address computer code spy-ware by requiring that *all* software in
*any* aspect of vote processing be Open to general inspection by any
concerned person. In this I really mean "all" and "any". Some will say
that this is too extreme, but if computers are to be used, and there
is strong pressure to use them, then the software must be truly verifiable.
There *are* techniques for ensuring that the actual software used is
identical
to the software approved by some testing authority. There are techniques
for ensuring that the 'machine code' software was actually derived from
some particular version of 'source code'. The trouble with these techniques
is that they leave very little wriggle room for 'proprietary' software,
and some people believe that 'proprietary' is the American Way.

Any other ideas as to how to have both unique ID that precludes ballot
stuffing and end-to-end voter privacy? Without some, we seem to have
an unresolvable contradiction.

In the past, paper ballots were printed on special paper stock and given
watermarks and other special treatment that were very hard to copy. But
'modern' ballots that are printed on laser printers are really rather
easy to reproduce exactly with modern laser printers.

This laser printer ballot box stuffing seems to me to be a problem for
all forms of vote counting that use ballots printed on laser printers,
including hand counting of votes. So if one allows the possibility of
laser printed ballots, one commits to requiring a lot more physical
security than most people think is reasonable. There is a real citizen
education problem here.

On Mon, Feb 27, 2006 at 08:31:27PM -0700, Some Guy wrote:
> Problem --- if I photocopy ballots and stuff the box and there are no
> pre-printed serial numbers on the ballots, then how can you tell that
there
> are extra ballots? Eh?
>
> paul t
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Paul E Condon [mailto:pecondon@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx]
> Sent: Monday, February 27, 2006 1:17 PM
> To: cvv-discuss@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> Subject: Re: Secret ballot and the Colorado constitution
> <snip>
> I had been thinking, rather narrowly, on only the situation of
> pre-printed ballots that are handed to voters by judges in a precinct
> voting place. Your comment points to the value of a print head in the
> scanner at the ballot processing stage. If each ballot is marked at
> the time it is scanned, that mark can be used to ensure that ballots
> are not double counted. But it plays hob with reprocessing ballots
> that will need to be done because of computer malfunction.
>
> Putting the scanners in the polling place could spoil your good idea.
> If the ballot is scanned and marked while the voter is in a vacinity
> there is still an opportunity for learning the association of vote
> with voter.
>
> --
> Paul E Condon
> pecondon@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
>
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--
Paul E Condon
pecondon@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

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