Re: Secret ballot and the Colorado constitution

[Paul E Condon <pecondon@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

On Tue, Feb 28, 2006 at 10:59:51AM -0700, Some Guy wrote:
> Watermarks are crap. They can be reproduced. If not with a modern
> photocopier, then with a scanner.
> 
> While it might be possible to notice a reproduced watermark or copied
> ballot, the fraud is NEVER noticed until after the ballots are in the works.
> 
> If the ballot arrive without serialization or some kind of unique
> identifier, then they are all vanilla. If unique identifiers are imprinted
> when the ballots are being scanned, then we've added insult to injury by
> including them in the ballot run.
> I'm not think and writing clearly this morning. I mean that the ballots
> would not only be allowed but be validated as real ballots by imprinting
> them after being cast.
> 
> While the constitution says no markings, I am clear that there needs to be
> marking and the computers need to know what was printed and issued.
> The database of serial numbers could tell us that 'yes' the number in
> question is a valid number, but could it tell us what ballots were actually
> given to voters and what ones are still in a pile on a pallet in storage? In
> order to know what ballots had been issued the clerk would have to keep
> track of them.
> Then we come full circle to the real issue. Can a unique identifier be
> tracked back to a particular voter.
> 
> Once again - I make the statement that everyone here seems to hate:
> I don't give a rat's ass who knows how I voted. If you ask me I will tell
> you, if I can remember.
> 
> Before the end of the civil war voting was not secret. I believe that the US
> made a wrong turn in making ballots secret. My opinion appears to be in the
> minority, but that is still my opinion.

But a lot of people think that a secret ballot is important, and even
more people think that someone else thinks its important and those
other peoples' concerns need to be accomodated. 

As an election judge I have encountered people who are truly puzzled by
the procedures of a secret ballot, and people who are quick to complain
about any deviation from the procedure that they think should be followed
for a secret ballot. Both need to be accomodated by the system. Neither
can be ignored or ridiculed.

But ridicule of stupid people is so much fun ;-)

> 
> Paul Tiger
> 
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Paul E Condon [mailto:pecondon@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx]
> Sent: Monday, February 27, 2006 10:06 PM
> To: cvv-discuss@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> Subject: Re: Secret ballot and the Colorado constitution
> 
> No ID marks until the moment of scanning was Paul W.'s idea intended
> to address the problem of some spy-ware or some hidden cameras getting
> information that could be used to associate a particular marked ballot
> with a particular voter. Maybe these problems need to be addressed in
> some other way. Perhaps, we can:
> 
> 1) Discourage hidden cameras and other non-computer spy techniques by
> application of traditional techniques of physical security, the kind
> of stuff that security guards are trained to do. Use State Troopers, etc.
> 
> 2) Address computer code spy-ware by requiring that *all* software in
> *any* aspect of vote processing be Open to general inspection by any
> concerned person. In this I really mean "all" and "any". Some will say
> that this is too extreme, but if computers are to be used, and there
> is strong pressure to use them, then the software must be truly verifiable.
> There *are* techniques for ensuring that the actual software used is
> identical
> to the software approved by some testing authority. There are techniques
> for ensuring that the 'machine code' software was actually derived from
> some particular version of 'source code'. The trouble with these techniques
> is that they leave very little wriggle room for 'proprietary' software,
> and some people believe that 'proprietary' is the American Way.
> 
> Any other ideas as to how to have both unique ID that precludes ballot
> stuffing and end-to-end voter privacy? Without some, we seem to have
> an unresolvable contradiction.
> 
> In the past, paper ballots were printed on special paper stock and given
> watermarks and other special treatment that were very hard to copy. But
> 'modern' ballots that are printed on laser printers are really rather
> easy to reproduce exactly with modern laser printers.
> 
> This laser printer ballot box stuffing seems to me to be a problem for
> all forms of vote counting that use ballots printed on laser printers,
> including hand counting of votes. So if one allows the possibility of
> laser printed ballots, one commits to requiring a lot more physical
> security than most people think is reasonable. There is a real citizen
> education problem here.
> 
> On Mon, Feb 27, 2006 at 08:31:27PM -0700, Some Guy wrote:
> > Problem --- if I photocopy ballots and stuff the box and there are no
> > pre-printed serial numbers on the ballots, then how can you tell that
> there
> > are extra ballots? Eh?
> >
> > paul t
> >
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: Paul E Condon [mailto:pecondon@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx]
> > Sent: Monday, February 27, 2006 1:17 PM
> > To: cvv-discuss@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> > Subject: Re: Secret ballot and the Colorado constitution
> > <snip>
> > I had been thinking, rather narrowly, on only the situation of
> > pre-printed ballots that are handed to voters by judges in a precinct
> > voting place. Your comment points to the value of a print head in the
> > scanner at the ballot processing stage. If each ballot is marked at
> > the time it is scanned, that mark can be used to ensure that ballots
> > are not double counted. But it plays hob with reprocessing ballots
> > that will need to be done because of computer malfunction.
> >
> > Putting the scanners in the polling place could spoil your good idea.
> > If the ballot is scanned and marked while the voter is in a vacinity
> > there is still an opportunity for learning the association of vote
> > with voter.
> >
> > --
> > Paul E Condon
> > pecondon@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> >
> > --
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> 
> --
> Paul E Condon
> pecondon@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> 
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-- 
Paul E Condon           
pecondon@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx