From: "Joel Leventhal" <Jleventhal@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
To: <attendees@xxxxxxx>
CC: "Mcgrath, Bob___PAIC_Mkt" <bob.mcgrath@xxxxxxxxxx>
Subject: Fw: voting and VVPAT
Date: Tue, 18 Jul 2006 20:16:33 -0600
FYI
----- Original Message -----
From: Harvie Branscomb
To: org@xxxxxxxxxxxxx ; jacaro@xxxxxxxx
Cc: candidates@xxxxxxxxxxxxx ; Teak Simonton ; helen Lindow ; Ken Gordon ;
lewis_branscomb@xxxxxxxxxxx
Sent: Tuesday, July 18, 2006 2:40 PM
Subject: voting and VVPAT
Dems and Republicans
Mark Udall and the House Science Committee will have a meeting
on Wednesday about election reform. I have sent the following message
to the House Science Committee Democratic Caucus web site.
Those testifying at this hearing are:
a.. Donetta Davidson, Commissioner, Election Assistance Commission
(Washington, DC)
b.. Dr. William Jeffrey, Director, National Institute of Standards and
Technology (Gaithersburg, MD)
c.. Mary Kiffmeyer, Secretary of State, State of Minnesota (St. Paul,
MN)
d.. Linda Lamone, Administrator of Elections, Maryland State Board of
Elections (Annapolis, MD)
e.. John Groh, Chairman, Election Technology Council, Information
Technology Association of America (Arlington, VA)
f.. Dr. David Wagner, Professor of Computer Science, University of
California (Berkeley, CA)
You can send a message to the Committee at the following address:
http://sciencedems.house.gov/publications/hearings_markups_details.aspx?NewsID=1157
Or you can simply sign up for information updates.
MoveOn has an initiative on this topic as well.
http://political.moveon.org/call?tg=FHCO_02&cp_id=374&id=8230-1179658-C6MC9f.56ilH3U9z2EBb4Q&t=2
Voter Verified Paper Audit Trail by itself is not enough to protect the
election.
Harvie Branscomb
Chair, Eagle County Democrats
07/18/2006 16:22
Harvie Branscomb
El Jebel, CO 81623
hbranscomb@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
Can we share your name and information with Member Offices? Yes
970-9631369
I am the Chair of Eagle County Democrats and an experienced election
evangelist for Eagle County. I think the VVPAT is not sufficient to insure
quality elections, and a true hand marked paper ballot is preferable. We
must encourage hand counting wherever possible, and even though I am a
technologist, for voting we must reduce the interference of mechanical and
electronic processes as much as possible in the voting system(as is done in
Switzerland, for example where the entire nationwide election, up to 6
times per year, is hand counted on paper within 4 hours). The VVPAT which
is required in Colorado will only work if the following apply:
1) the VVPAT printer is available with the DRE, working throughout the
election and supplied with paper and kept secure;
2) the VVPAT printer functions correctly - we have evidence otherwise for
the Hart eSlate where the printer self test gives various print results
during the acceptance test;
3) each voter actually verifies the VVPAT- with Hart eSlate, the blind
voter can not verify, and the normal voter is unlikely to verify because
the lcd screen with larger brighter font is also showing the ballot
information at the same time as the voter is expected to verify the
smaller, darker, less visible paper to the left of the machine;
4) if the paper roll for the VVPAT is actually legally defined as "the
ballot" for purposes of any recount;
5) if any recount instructions provided by an attorney general or secretary
of state actually requires that the paper roll be read by hand and not by
machine... and not by reading the bar code which is printed on every paper
record for this purpose. The bar code is not verifiable by the voter, and
if there is a reliable way to hand count the paper roll;
6) if every court with jurisdiction determines that the paper record is to
be treated as the ballot after considering the actual experience of actual
voters;
7) if a and recount is run in case the spread of the election either within
the local jurisdiction or across the entire district applying to the race
is within the margin of error defined by the Logic and Accuracy test. The
LAT in Colorado calls for a minimum of 25 ballots per party plus enough for
each ballot style, or perhaps only 75 ballots to be tested. This gives an
accuracy for the test of only greater than 1%, hence if the vote spread
were to approach 1%, say less than 2%, a hand recount should be conducted
to overcome any uncertainty about the ability of the machine to count
votes. If multiple counties are involved in the district, the margin of
error defined by the LAT for each county should be summed and compared to
the spread of the votes on that race in the district. If the sum of the
margins for error exceeds the spread of the vote in that race, a hand
recount must be called for. The LAT is the only proof that the voting
system is functioning correctly, but it's accuracy is severely limited by
the number of ballots provided for the test. There is a significant
likelihood that the errors contributed by individual counties would not
average out, and no proof that they would. The law regarding recounts is
very insufficient in this regard. I
n addition, a post election audit is laudable, but it must be conducted as
a true audit, with truly random choice of ballots and machines and races,
and any irregularity must be logged and made available to the public and
kept in a repository of election irregularities. It is important that the
machinery should offer the opportunity of a true audit, and not a recount
of a random set of ballots, using a separate process at a separate time.
Finally each state must have a bipartisan oversight of the functions of the
secretary of state and each county must have bipartisan oversight of the
functions of the county clerk in regards to elections.
Harvie Branscomb Chair, Eagle County Democrats hbranscomb@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
970-9631369