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Re: Post-Election Audits for DREs require JBC tally report
So, I read Neal's email about audit again after finding it in the
archive, and I notice a weird situation:
For the Dem primary there are about a dozen issues on the ballot, but
for only one of them does the voter actually get to make a choice. If
two issues are randomly selected for audit (see underlining, below),
the only real contest will not be audited. Or does 'race' in the
Election Rules mean a contested issue? In which case there is only
one race on the ballot, so two races cannot be audited. Maybe audit
that one race twice? ;-)
On Tue, Jul 18, 2006 at 09:03:50AM -0600, Neal McBurnett wrote:
> Josh Liss and Shelley Bailey:
>
> It appears that you are not implementing an audit of the eSlate
> results. This is required by both the statues and the Secretary of
> State rule, and is separate from the issue we've discussed before
> about the need to do an audit of the scanner results (BallotNow).
> A partial recount is not adequate for either type of ballot.
>
> The Election Rules (8 CCR 1505-1, as adopted June 14, 2006) says:
> http://www.elections.colorado.gov/DDefault.aspx?tid=184
>
> 11.5.4.6 For Direct Electronic Devices (DREs) that do meet the
> requirement of section 1-5-802, C.R.S., used for any function of
> counting ballots in an election, after the close of the polls, the
> designated election official will manually verify all of the voter
> verified paper record produced with the report generated for that
> specific devices, which contains the election summary report. The
> Secretary of State shall randomly select two races to be manually
----------------------------^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
> verified.
>
> As noted during the training for the Machine Judges, and in the eSlate
> Desk Reference manual we got, each JBC can produce a Tally report all
> by itself at the end of the election day ("Print tally" on page 26).
> But for some reason you have disabled this function in our system.
>
> Without generating this Print Tally before the machines to be audited
> are randomly selected, there are no results available to be audited.
> Taking the MBB out of the JBC and using the separate tally system to
> produce results for it on a separate Election database amounts to a
> recount, which is not an audit, does not comply with the statute, and
> does not lend the same level of confidence in the final results.
>
> The Print Tally function should be re-enabled, and tested during a
> LAT before the election begins.
>
> Below is an update of the issue I brought up before the 2005 election
> about the need for a BallotNow audit.
>
> Please give me a call so we can talk about this.
>
> Thank you,
>
> Neal McBurnett http://mcburnett.org/neal/
> 303-494-6493
>
> ----
>
> Summary:
>
> I worked with the legislature in 2005 to get a requirement for audits
> in our law. Unfortunately, the Secretary of State's rules did not
> properly implement the law, as detailed below, and true audits were
> not in fact done - they did recounts instead. Without a true audit,
> the public has much less reason to trust the system. The RFP
> Evaluation Team recommended that true audits be implemented. Please
> help us fix this problem.
>
> The Post-Election Audits Rule, 11.5.4, from the Secretary of State is
> out of compliance with the statutes, for the case of central-count
> election machines. This affected the 2005 elections in nearly all
> Colorado counties, since there is a large central-count component in
> most counties due to early, absentee and mail-in voting. The problem
> will get worse in 2006 since we just learned that, e.g., the Hart
> Intercivic eSlate system cannot produce an auditable report of the
> votes on each DRE (electronic voting machine) either, as detailed at
>
> http://www.coloradovoter.net/moin.cgi/ManualCountAudit
>
> Please help us get the Secretary of State's office to fix the rule as
> suggested below, and work with the county elections officials to make
> sure they follow the intent of the law. The changes made in June of
> 2006 increased the percentage of audits for some results, but did not
> address either of the legal issues below.
>
> There are two legal issues:
>
> 1) The rule does not implement an _audit_ of the original
> tabulation. It calls instead for a _recount_, and is thus only
> another, weak, _test_ of a single machine. The purpose of an audit
> is to ensure that the device worked during the actual counting
> process, not that it can be made to work afterwords. The Logic and
> Accuracy Test already addresses testing. This distinction is clearly
> a part of the legislative history of the audit requirement.
>
> 2) The rule does not call for a "specified percentage" of the ballots
> to be counted, as required by law. Rather, it limits the a tally to a
> maximum of an absolute number of ballots: 500. For all other
> equipment, the goal of the statute is to audit about five percent of
> the ballots. Looking at only 500 ballots would be a fraction of
> a percent of a common turnout in Boulder - totally inadequate.
>
> For precinct-count systems and DREs, the law and rule are consistent
> in calling for a five percent manual tally, and for audits of actual
> election results. The rule for central count machines should call for
> no less.
>
> In particular, as recommended during testimony before the legislature
> last spring, for the Hart Intercivic equipment the rule should select
> a significant number of batches of votes, and a significant total
> number of ballots, for manual tallies. See this document for details:
>
> http://www.coloradovoter.net/moin.cgi/ManualCountAudit
>
> Here is the relevant text from the statute:
>
> 1-7-514 (1) (a) (I) ... where a central count voting device is in use
> in the county, the rules promulgated by the secretary pursuant to
> subsection (5) of this section shall require an audit of a specified
> percentage of ballots counted within the county.
>
> and here is the relevant rule:
>
> 11.5.4.4 For Optical Scanners used for the purpose of counting
> ballots in a Central Count/vote center environment as defined herein,
> the designated election official shall randomly select five (5)
> percent but not more than five hundred (500) ballots of all the
> ballots counted on the specific audited device. If the amount of
> ballots is less than five hundred (500) on the audited device, then a
> minimum of twenty percent (20%) of the ballots counted on the device
> will be manually verified. The public counter for that voting device
> shall be reset to zero, and the ballots shall be recounted on the
> voting device. A new report will be generated from the electronic
> count of the ballots and shall be manually verified. The ballots and
> a copy of the report shall be sealed in a separate container and
> secured with the remainder of the official election records for the
> election. The Secretary of State shall randomly select two races to
> be manually verified.
>
> The solution to the first problem requires care during the original
> vote counting process. In order to preserve the principle of random
> selection of the audited results, it is necessary to obtain tallies
> for small batches of ballots. During the audit, the elections
> official then selects random batches, and compares manual tallies for
> each batch.with the original machine tallies, as is done with other
> types of equipment.
>
> Hopefully the second problem can be fixed by just substituting the
> word "less" for "more", and making sure the percentage refers to all
> votes centrally counted:
>
> the designated election official shall randomly select five (5)
> percent but not _less_ than five hundred (500) ballots of all the
> ballots counted on _all the Central Count/vote center equipment_.
>
>
> The rule also has to spell out the need for an auditable report as
> clarified at
>
> http://www.coloradovoter.net/moin.cgi/ManualCountAudit
>
> and that needs to be required of voting equipment before it is
> certified.
>
> In addition, the random selection of machines to test is currently
> scheduled to happen "Within twenty-four (24) hours of the close of
> polls". I the case of a delayed count or delayed reporting, this
> should not happen until the machines are done counting and a tally has
> been obtained and made known.
>
> Thank you,
>
> Neal McBurnett http://bcn.boulder.co.us/~neal/
> 303-494-6493
--
Paul E Condon
pecondon@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx