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Re: Wait just a friggin' minute!



I've gone though my spiel many time on this list, so I'm only going to give the brief version here.

If you use only paper, your security and reliability are limited by physical constraints. What are your going to do if someone steals a ballot box, or firebombs a voting place? You may object to the reliablity of a specific implementation of a DRE, but the concept is valid and should not be outlawed. If someone can do it well, they should be able to.

The idea that a paper ballot marked and read by a computer is somehow more reliable than an electronic one (that doesn't have to go through this conversion) is ridiculous. I'm more than happy to talk about the difficulties in signal processing and the costs of technology if anyone's interested.

Let's stop kidding ourselves. Looking at a paper ballot before you put it in a box IS NOT VERIFIABLE. The only way to verify that your vote was counted is to allow each person to see the results of their vote AFTER the ballot is processed and the results tabulated.

N




AlKolwicz wrote:


Nick,

We are not opposed to vote marking machines.  These machines warn voters of
under votes, prevent over votes, provide disabled voters with a way to vote
in private, AND print the voter's votes on a paper ballot that the voter can
verify before casting.

These devices provide voter verifiable ballots.  Paper ballots provide a way
to verify vote counting.  In addition, paper ballot tracking systems, using
serialized removable ballot stubs and poll books, provide a way to audit
every ballot and every voter -- a way to "balance" each election.

Vote marking machines might look and feel like a DRE, but have additional
hardware -- a scanner and page printer.  By eliminating the digital ballot,
the vote marking machine is trustworthy.  If the machine makes an error, the
only place that the error can affect results is any error printed on the
paper ballot.  Since the paper ballot is verifiable by the voter, the error
is detectable.

Because of their reliance on a digital ballot, we think that DRE's cannot
meet fundamental verifiability and auditing requirements.


Al