RE: [stopvotefraud] Re: [VerifiedVoting.org lobbyists] Ensign Bill S2437

["alkolwicz" <alkolwicz@xxxxxxxxx>]

Hi Pam,

We actually like the idea of touch screens and other voter-interfaces that
provide private voting to the disabled, eliminate over votes, warn voters of
under votes (and potentially offer an explicit "under vote" choice), and
increase the rate of accurate interpretation of the votes.  

We believe that the record produced by the system must be the ONLY record of
vote, and that the voter must be able to VERIFY that the official record of
votes records the votes that the voter intends, AFTER the votes are recorded
and BEFORE the votes are cast.  If the voter does not like what is recorded
on the permanent record, they must be permitted to exchange the record for a
new opportunity to vote.

There are additional requirements, but I shan't go into them here.
Architectures such as that offered by the Vogue Election Systems' AUTOMARK
illustrate the type of VOTE-RECORDING system I described.

I guess it is fair to say that the some bill may not intend to deceive the
voter -- but none-the-less that is what they would do.  In my opinion it is
quite cynical to ceremoniously present the voter with a summary of what the
voter intended, ask the voter to carefully check that the paper correctly
records what the voter intends, and NOT USE that verified record to
determine the election result.  Instead the system will proceed to determine
the election results from a different record that initially or subsequently
contains votes other than those the voter intended.  If there is any doubt
that this can and has and will happen, and is unstoppable, we should confer
further.

Colorado law regarding "recount" has been modified by HB04-1227.  I have
inserted the revisions into the statute to produce the "new" law and pasted
it below.  Paragraphs 1.10.5-110(1)(b), (3) and (4) were revised.  As you
can see in (3) the law now permits a recount of votes cast using either
"electronic ballot images" or "permanent paper records".

NOTE-1:  While the term "ballot image" is defined, the term "permanent paper
record" is not defined.  However it is required in order to pass
certification according to a new section including:

1-5-615

(p) SAVES AND PRODUCES THE RECORDS NECESSARY TO AUDIT THE
OPERATION OF THE ELECTRONIC OR ELECTROMECHANICAL VOTING SYSTEM,
INCLUDING A PERMANENT PAPER RECORD WITH A MANUAL AUDIT CAPACITY.

(2) THE PERMANENT PAPER RECORD PRODUCED BY THE ELECTRONIC
OR ELECTROMECHANICAL VOTING SYSTEM SHALL BE AVAILABLE AS AN
OFFICIAL RECORD FOR ANY RECOUNT CONDUCTED FOR ANY ELECTION IN
WHICH THE SYSTEM WAS USED.

NOTE-2:  The Secretary of State shall decide which method is used.  It can
easily be proven that counting of paper ballots can be inaccurate, the SOS
is on record as disliking the recount of the permanent paper records, and it
is many times more expensive to count votes on permanent paper records than
on electronic ballot images.  Additionally, it is impossible to prove that
the count of votes recorded on electronic records does not reflect the
voter's intent.  Therefore, it is highly unlikely that the votes on the
permanent paper records will ever be counted.  (Past experience has shown
that the SOS will not release these records for independent assessment.)  

NOTE-3:  To achieve privacy, there is a requirement to randomize the ballot
images.  This makes it impossible to prove that any voter's votes are
INCORRECTLY recorded.

There are numerous additional problems, and you are absolutely correct when
you say, "VVPBs are insignificant in CO unless they are the first line of
count."  Your reason (the recount law) is not correct, but the new statutes
are a sham -- another intention to deceive voters into the belief that their
vote will be counted as they intend.

When you mention the form of the verified ballot, we believe that the voter
should use the same ballot whether they hand mark or machine mark the votes
on their ballot.  Every ballot must contain the full ballot text so that
when the voter verifies their vote, they know what they are verifying --
rather than a shorthand "AMENDMENT 28 YES".

The problem with a two ballot system is that the ballot that is counted
controls.  Fraud and errors that creep into this ballot decide the election.
In almost all cases the "other ballot" will not be counted.  Intuitively I
dislike the two ballot approach because I fear that elections will be thrown
to the courts to decide whether the candidate that won the electronic ballot
vote or the candidate that won the paper ballot vote is the winner.  This
cannot help but cause bad feelings and DISTRUST of our election system.
And, if one race comes out different, then all races become suspect, and
even all elections that use (or have used) the vendor's equipment.

It's not worth the risk to go paperless.  It's not worth the risk to go
dual-ballot.

Al Kolwicz

CAMBER
Citizens for Accurate Mail Ballot Election Results
2867 Tincup Circle
Boulder, CO 80305
303-494-1540
AlKolwicz@xxxxxxxxx
www.users.qwest.net/~alkolwicz 
http://coloradovoter.blogspot.com 


   

=======================================================================

Colorado Statute as revised by HB 1227

1-10.5-110. Procedures for recount on direct recording electronic voting
equipment.

(1) Any recount procedure for votes cast on direct record electronic voting
machines adopted by a designated election official shall:

(a) Be submitted in writing to the secretary of state; and

(b) Provide for a recount of votes cast on such voting machine as prescribed
by this section.

 (2) A recount of votes cast on direct record electronic voting machines
shall include early voting, election day voting, and election day emergency
voting. The designated election official shall produce a recount report that
shall include, but shall not be limited to, the following:

(a) A summary of the recount results;

(b) Political subdivision recount results; and

(c) Precinct recount results.

(3) A RECOUNT of votes cast on direct record electronic voting machines
shall be conducted using electronic ballot images OR PERMANENT PAPER
RECORDS. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SHALL DECIDE WHICH METHOD OF RECOUNT IS USED
IN EACH CASE, BASED ON THE SECRETARY'S DETERMINATION OF WHICH METHOD WILL
ENSURE THE MOST ACCURATE COUNT, SUBJECT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW FOR ABUSE OF
DISCRETION. As used in this section, "ballot image" means a record of each
vote cast by a voter that is stored on a removable memory device contained
in such voting machine. All ballot images shall be randomized in such voting
machine to assure voter anonymity.

(4) All recounts of votes cast on direct record electronic voting machines
shall retabulate vote totals from individual ballot images OR PERMANENT
PAPER RECORDS. Tabulating incremented or summary vote totals from individual
direct record electronic voting machines shall not constitute a recount for
purposes of compliance with this section. 

 (5) Before any recount of votes cast on direct record electronic voting
machines, the designated election official shall store or record all
previous preelection, official election, or postelection tabulations of
votes cast on such voting machine on an external device such as a diskette,
tape, or compact disc.

(6) No tabulation system software utilized by a designated election official
to perform a recount of votes cast on a direct record electronic voting
machine shall delete any previously tabulated results from such voting
machine, including preelection, official election, or postelection
tabulations of votes cast, in order to perform the recount.

(7) If the retabulation of ballot images from a removable memory device is
impossible due to destruction, loss, or any other reason, the audit trail
from the direct record electronic voting machine from which such device was
removed shall be copied to a new transfer device and the ballot images shall
then be recounted by the tabulation system software.

(8) After all of the ballot images from all of the removable memory devices
used in the election have been retabulated by the tabulation system
software, the designated election official shall produce the recount reports
described in subsection (2) of this section to determine if the recount
results and official election results match.


=================================================

 

-----Original Message-----
From: pam@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx [mailto:pam@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx] 
Sent: Tuesday, May 25, 2004 5:19 PM
To: AlKolwicz@xxxxxxxxx
Cc: 'Andrew G. Silver'; lobbyists@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx;
stopvotefraud@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx; ncverifiablevoting@xxxxxxxxx; Citizens for
Verifiable Voting; Dr. Charles Corry; Sheila Horton; Pete Klammer; Bob
Mcgrath; Carol Mehesy; Donna Plutschuck; Monty Lambie; Peter Raich; Tracy
Abell
Subject: RE: [stopvotefraud] Re: [VerifiedVoting.org lobbyists] Ensign Bill
S2437

Hello Al - Before I comment on your comments, below, let me
say that I consider voter-verified paper ballots on touch-screens
essential but not sufficient.  If a touch-screen is to be used
at all, it MUST have a voter-verified paper ballot, but there's
more to it than that.

Whether they SHOULD be used at all is a separate question.
But they ARE being used and/or are about to be used in
many places.

If a bill that calls for a VVPB gets passed at this point,
it may mean that if counties DO BUY THEM... then they
would buy them with VVPBs... or WAIT to buy them so as
to avoid an expensive retrofit in the near future.
Counties' having to delay the purchase of paperless
DREs gives us a chance to get them to reconsider a better
alternative, such as optical-scan or other paper
ballots... especially if they have to "deal with paper
anyway."  Case in point:  Ohio, where the legislature
recently agreed that VVPBs would be required in the near
future.  Suddenly LOTS of counties that had been on the
verge of getting new touchscreens have delayed their
decision (at last count, 22 out of 31).

Quoting alkolwicz <alkolwicz@xxxxxxxxx>:

> The "audit trail" bills are intended to deceive voters into believing that
> they are verifying the votes that will decide an election.  This is not
what
> these bills do.

It may be that some bills are introduced with a deceptive intent.
I don't believe that's the case for all such bills.
BUT... that being said, the Colorado perspective
naturally is affected by the CO law that says only
the original counting method can be used.  Thus
VVPBs are insignificant in CO unless they are the first
line of count.

Other states (such as CA, where I live) have quite
different rules about recounts.  Here ANYONE has the right
to ask for a recount, and if the original was done by
electronic means, the recount can be done electronically,
manually, or both.  (That's why here in CA we point out
that DREs that LACK a VVPB don't comply with state law...
because they don't allow for a meaningful MANUAL recount.)

> Instead, voters would be verifying a secondary document that: (1) does not
> necessarily reflect the voter's choices, (2) is printed in a form that is
> excessively difficult for voters to verify and costly for officials to use
> for independent counting and (3) is not the official ballot and will
rarely
> be counted.

Voter-verification of a paper ballot, to me, means that
if the voter's choices are NOT reflected on the paper
they review, that they get to spoil the ballot and
start over.  It's not verification if the choices shown
are not what you intended.  If a bill doesn't allow
the voter to do it over, then it is not a good bill.

The manner of printout for a VVPB from a touchscreen or
DRE would depend on design, which surely varies from
one vendor to another.  Diebold Election Systems, in a bid,
told Santa Clara County in CA that it already had the
capability to print what they refer to as a "voter
receipt."  But they're talking about the on-board
thermal roll used for the zero tapes and the tally
tapes at the end of the day... the sample looked much like
an ATM receipt.  I would agree that both reviewing and
hand-counting of such printouts would be unpleasant
(but I'd take it, over no printout at all, if it means
I can confirm my vote was recorded as intended).

On the other hand, I saw a demonstration of an AccuPoll
printout, which came out on an 8.5 x 11 piece of paper.
The print could have been larger, but that's a design
change... it was simple to discern one's choices, though.

We've been told that some DREs are capable of
printing an "image of the ballot cast" which may be
a screen-shot of the summary screen on the DRE.  If that
is the case, it should be pretty easy to read.  Certainly
no harder than the summary screen on the DRE...  But I
haven't seen any of those personally.

Finally, which governs--paper or electronic:  One of
the things I noted about the Ensign bill is
that the specific language about the paper document
spells out that it GOVERNS in the case of any discrepancy.

Procedural rules about whether the paper should be the
ONLY thing counted or the FIRST thing counted or should
ALWAYS be counted are left out... presumably because
states (like CO) won't want to be told how they should count;
in other words, a "states rights thing" as we heard often
in DC recently... and that may end up being a separate
battle, which is why groups like CAMBER and CFVI are so
crucially important.

Having a paper ballot to count so that the voter can
verify that his/her vote was recorded as intended,
whether that comes in the form of a VVPB or an optical
scan ballot or a hand-mark, hand-count paper ballot,
is the FIRST requirement.

By itself, it isn't sufficient.

But it is necessary.


>
> The fundamental requirement is this: each voter must be able to verify
that
> their real votes that will be used to determine the election outcome are
> recorded as the voter intends and must be able to obtain a replacement
> ballot if they are not.  (There are additional requirements such as:
> recorded votes must be permanent, every ballot must be secure and
accounted
> for, and the interpretation of votes must be unambiguous, but these
> requirements are not documented here.)
>
>
>
> We continue to ask for the following:
>
>
>
> Trustworthy Elections Resolution
>
>
>
> WHEREAS trustworthy elections are basic to democracy,
>
>
>
> WHEREAS trustworthy elections require that each vote is anonymous, secure,
> verified by the voter and counted as intended by the voter,
>
>
>
> WHEREAS paperless voting machines make it impossible for us to verify that
> our votes are correctly recorded,
>
>
>
> WHEREAS paperless voting machines make it impossible to prove that each
vote
> is correctly counted,
>
>
>
> WHEREAS a receipt printer on a paperless voting machine would not solve
> these problems because the votes printed on the receipt can be different
> from the votes stored in the machine, and because votes on the receipts
> would rarely be counted,
>
>
>
> WHEREAS accurate re-counting requires that the votes on the original paper
> ballots be examined and counted, and that the results from a previous
count
> are not known to the people doing the re-counting,
>
>
>
> WHEREAS failure to conduct trustworthy elections opens the door to
> undetectable errors and fraud and destroys voter confidence,
>
>
>
> THEREFORE, we voters want to hand mark or machine mark our votes onto
> full-ballot-text paper ballots, to check our votes before we cast them, to
> know that the votes on our paper ballot are what get counted, and to have
> access to proof that every ballot is accounted for and that every vote is
> correctly understood and counted.
>
>
>
>
>
> Al Kolwicz
>
>
>
> CAMBER
>
> Citizens for Accurate Mail Ballot Election Results
>
> 2867 Tincup Circle
>
> Boulder, CO 80305
>
> 303-494-1540
>
> AlKolwicz@xxxxxxxxx
>
> www.users.qwest.net/~alkolwicz
>
> http://coloradovoter.blogspot.com