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Boulder Elections Review Committee




I attended the first meeting of the Boulder Election Review Committee yesterday at the Courthouse. Here are some of my notes.


The meeting was about two and a half hours, started with some introductions, Linda Salas gave a lengthy presentation, the by-laws were reviewed and adopted, and finally the three members of the public got to speak.

The makeup of the committee has been published in the paper, and I'll say that I was impressed with the quality of some of the questions, and the willingness of the committee members to make sure their questions were answered. One detail that might not have been known in advance is that Drew Durham has been appointed by the Secretary of State to fill the seat on the committee that Paul Danish requested for her office.


Some Information from Linda's Presentation:
Linda said that among other circumstances, the 2 days of LAT testing and the 2 days in court contributed to their delay in counting, as did a statewide delay due to the Nader inclusion lawsuit.


According to my notes, they had 13,000 damaged ballots, with 27,000 damaged races.

There is a suspicion that a "toner" issue may have been involved, faded printing was apparently visible on some ballots that were inspected.

All undervotes were autoresolved.

The counting was finished Friday afternoon.



Things the Committee Asked About:

The Paper Ballots & Printing
Often in detail, e.g., "Did the postscript files contain individual ballot images?"
Questions about pre-election testing and quality control sampling procedures for the ballots.
Were the ballots printed on a printing press or a high speed photocopy device?
Was a specification provided by the system vendor for their ballots?


Precinct Optical Scanning
	Much talk about Larimer County and "what went right" there.


Other info from questions and answers:


A Hart representative (Chuck Logan) present stated that there is supposed to be a 20% tolerance around the box for the mark on the ballot.

There was some discussion about how many times the ballot stock was run through a printer, 3: watermark, signature and ballot text + barcodes, with ballot text and barcodes both during the same pass.

Errors began to be noticed after about 1,000 ballots had been run, and then on all systems simultaneously, but there was no indication at first, or from absentee/early counting.

A Kodak representative was called in on election night and determined there were no scanner errors.

Discussion of paper weight and postscript file preparation as well as other printing specs.

Hart had never previously experienced a barcode failure.

Discussion about the printing vendor (Eagle Direct) and that they had called Xerox representatives, although they had also discussed Heidelberg printing presses and "multiple printers" (interpreted as multiple printing devices by the Clerk's office, but may have meant multiple subcontractors).

Questions about how the ballots were serialized, the number of ballot styles (322 styles for 227 precincts), individual ballots in postscript files, large PDF files that could not be FTP'd to the printer.

The ballots cost $160,000, or approximately one dollar each.


the Committee asked for a sheet of definitions for the various acronyms and other terms that are used





Assertions that Should Be Examined:


Precinct Scanning is a Good Solution
Central Scanning is Always Easier than Precinct Scanning
An advantage of precinct scanning is that the voter can have the scanner verify that the ballot is counted correctly (this was said, I think what was meant was that the verification is that the ballot is marked correctly, i.e., no overvotes).


There were no problems in the Primary Election.



Some other interesting observations:

Scanning was centralized in Boulder, despite the earlier Commissioner's direction to spend additional money to have a scanning/processing center in Longmont.

There was little or no questioning of the issue of the appropriateness or Constitutionality of the barcode or serialization, but there was plenty of discussion about the barcodes themselves, the sequential balloting, and so on as they related to the issue of the damaged/rejected ballots.



The committee worked on its by-laws, probably the key details of which as far as CVV listmembers are concerned is that public comments will be limited to 3 minutes (although they would probably entertain giving time to another), and they expect written materials to be submitted at least 24 hours in advance.


Peter Richards spoke, introduced and provided some background.


Beat Fehr presented information on the Swiss Voting System, including an estimation that counting 160,000 ballots could be done in about 2 hours in the 227 precincts.

I presented a copy of the Jan 20, 2004 Clerk's correspondence about the evaluation materials, called attention to the Daily Camera editorial, and referenced materials submitted to Boulder City Council about the 1 to 1.5% error rate that has been documented in the system, and said thank you!

Please let me know if you want to know more about any of this. I'm sure I've overlooked something, but I hope nothing of major consequence.

Joe

Joe Pezzillo, Citizen Activist
Boulder, Colorado USA
jpezzillo@xxxxxxxxx