Hi Paul, Thanks for taking the time to respond. I hope I can clear up any misunderstandings. >Interesting Ivan - this is the first time that I have seen this message from >you. I'm not clear whom you mean by Linda and Mike. I meant: Hillary Hall, Paul Tiger, Linda Flack, and Mike Taylor, the recipients of my message. It was later sent to some interested election reformers. >I enjoyed your ideas about continuing to use the DataVote system. >Many of us did. Thank you. However, I am not and have never advocated "continuing" or restarting "use the DataVote [sic] system." The voting machine I briefly presented at the Longmont hearing was the "VotePuncher(TM)," a grassroots effort currently in the design phase. While based on the Datavote design, it uses no components from the now obsolete Datavote nor will it require any support or even contact from Sequoia Pacific. Sequoia's earlier intellectual property rights to the Datavote are now in the public domain. >History shows that the county repeatedly repaired this system so it >could be used over the years. Your comments suggests that the Datavote voting machine failed repeatedly. I do not believe this to be true. In fact, I believe the Datavote is the most reliable voting machine ever made. If you know of ANY case where the Datevote failed to accurately mark a ballot, please give me the details. I know there were a few cases where the ballots were inaccurately printed, misleading voters. I also know that the "tabulators," i.e., the optical scanners, frequently needed to be repaired after they had been used for decades. The Datavote also suffered from voter procedural errors such as the failure of the voter to turn the ballot over to vote the backside. The proposed VotePuncher does not have those shortcomings. Again, if you know of ANY case where the Datevote failed to accurately mark a ballot, please give me the details. >Now we've been federally mandated not to use it. HAVA and >state laws specifically disallow the use of ANY punch card >system. So we're stuck. It had to be replaced. This is NOT true. Here is the link to the actual HAVA (Help America Vote Act) document: www.fec.gov/hava/hava.htm In fact, HAVA specifically ALLOWS punch card voting systems. I have heard the rumor (from the SoS's office) that state laws disallow punch card systems. I am skeptical based on the source. Please send me the citation in the state law. I would like to read it. >There's lots not to like about this system, but one thing that can be done >with it is that it can be audited on-the-fly. There are not many systems >that can be audited in this way. So there is an advantage. While there are several systems that can be "audited on-the-fly," it can not be done without damaging the integrity of the election process. I hope it is not done. >All of the ERC members have discussed open source. We'd like that very much. >But we're not going to get that from any vendor in the US, and we have no >ability to force the manufacturers to do that. I am the spokesperson for The Democracy Technology Project, a grassroots effort unconnected to any voting machine company. We are the originators and promoters of the VotePuncher system. We will supply the software for our system, not a private company. Source and object code and all related documents will be publicly posted. However, the software in the VotePuncher is minuscule compared to a DRE. More importantly, the software in the VotePuncher is only used to help a voter avoid a procedural error, such as under- or over-voting or to assist previously disadvantaged voters such as blind citizens, not to record or tally a vote. THERE IS NO SOFTWARE OR HIDDEN ELECTRONICS BETWEEN THE VOTER'S HAND ON THE PUNCH HANDLE AND THE HOLE IN THE BALLOT! After the polls close, the votes are to be publicly hand counted in the precinct and then passed through an optical scanner to verify the hand count. Any discrepancies are to be resolved in the precinct by visually examining the ballots. The whole process will take less than an hour even for complex elections. >When I witnessed your presentation in Longmont, I couldn't help but to think >that you were addressing the wrong group. You should join Neal in his quest >to get NIST to listen. The objective of NIST (I assume you are referring to Technical Guidelines Development Committee established by the Help America Vote Act) and of The Democracy Technology Project (and myself) are not the same. I have attached our fifteen "Requirements for the Voting Process" that spell out our objectives. The VotePuncher system meets all fifteen of them. I know of no other voting system that does. I do not envision attempting to "get NIST to listen." I wish Neal luck. I spoke to the commission for two reasons: 1) to state that the Hart system could not be salvaged, and 2) to dispel the notion that it was not possible to meet all of the HAVA requirements, be reasonably priced and maintain the integrity necessary for free, fair and transparent elections. >If you've been paying any attention to what's going on in our state house, >then you'd know that there's lots of infighting to change very little. I have been. >Also, I believe you and many others have made assumptions about what we have >without either firsthand experience or listening to testimony. >But I would still agree with your summation. It's not likely that we'll get >much support from Hart given recent history. There seems to be an implicit assumption that "firsthand experience or listening to testimony" are necessary to know what is going on. You need to support that assumption. >One thing that we can do is to modify the software ourselves. It is not as >closed as some of the open source advocates have imagined. We own the >software and the source. The question is if the county is willing to deal >directly with the systems and ignore threats from Hart concerning >non-support, which were not getting anyway. As someone who has written software and managed projects involving software, I advise against it. It is essentially impossible to write software for equipment that is a complete mystery and without the builder's support. >To replace the system that we have (a nice thought) with >something less proprietary at this date in time seems highly unlikely. Highly unlikely or not, Hart needs to be replaced. A little perspective is needed here. $1.3 million spent in Boulder is a lot of money. So is the $3 billion, or so, assigned to buy electronic voting machines nationally. Both pale in comparison to the $300 billion, 1,500 American lives lost and tens of thousands of civilians killed in a war that would not have happened if the presidential election in 2000 had been determined by the majority of voting citizens and not by five unelected partisan political appointees. Americans have long agreed that the billions of dollars and the lives lost are worth the expense to maintain our democracy. (Yes, I served in the Armed Forces, not that that is relevant.) The money spent on Hart and other electronic voting systems has damaged our democracy, not supported it. This is not about what brand of police cars to buy or whether to remodel the courthouse. Our democracy is at stake. That democracy requires voting systems with integrity. Respectfully, -Ivan C. Meek -----Original Message----- From: Paul Tiger - LPBC - Outreach [mailto:outreach@xxxxxxxxxxxxx] Sent: Thursday, April 21, 2005 1:29 PM To: Ivan C Meek Cc: cvv-discuss@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx; Goef Cahoon Subject: RE: Re: Write-In Ballots Interesting Ivan - this is the first time that I have seen this message from you. I'm not clear whom you mean by Linda and Mike. I enjoyed your ideas about continuing to use the DataVote system. Many of us did. History shows that the county repeatedly repaired this system so it could be used over the years. Now we've been federally mandated not to use it. HAVA and state laws specifically disallow the use of ANY punch card system. So we're stuck. It had to be replaced. After much to do, the commissioners and clerk with a great deal of public input from a small group of activists, opted for a paper system. And that's what we have now. There's lots not to like about this system, but one thing that can be done with it is that it can be audited on-the-fly. There are not many systems that can be audited in this way. So there is an advantage. All of the ERC members have discussed open source. We'd like that very much. But we're not going to get that from any vendor in the US, and we have no ability to force the manufacturers to do that. When I witnessed your presentation in Longmont, I couldn't help but to think that you were addressing the wrong group. You should join Neal in his quest to get NIST to listen. I'd go for the low-tech solution any day of the week. This system is what we have, and it can be improved. There are legal deadlines that must be met by our clerk. To replace the system that we have (a nice thought) with something less proprietary at this date in time seems highly unlikely. From what I can see of the elections calendar (the law); BC would have to get the legislature to retro-actively change the laws. If you've been paying any attention to what's going on in our state house, then you'd know that there's lots of infighting to change very little. Technology is not the only issue here. It is highly politicized, and in my honest opinion - pretty darn stupid. Also, I believe you and many others have made assumptions about what we have without either firsthand experience or listening to testimony. But I would still agree with your summation. It's not likely that we'll get much support from Hart given recent history. One thing that we can do is to modify the software ourselves. It is not as closed as some of the open source advocates have imagined. We own the software and the source. The question is if the county is willing to deal directly with the systems and ignore threats from Hart concerning non-support, which were not getting anyway. Paul Tiger -----Original Message----- From: Ivan C Meek [mailto:ivan.meek@xxxxxxxxx] Sent: Thursday, April 21, 2005 10:29 AM To: Robert Mcgrath Cc: attendees@xxxxxxx; Joe Pezzillo; cvv-discuss@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx; Goef Cahoon Subject: RE: Re: Write-In Ballots Robert, I believe the problems in Boulder County are greater than the ballot handling of paper ballots. Here is the response I sent to some members of the Boulder Election Commission: --------------------------Forwarded Message--------------------------------- Hillary, Paul, Linda, Mike, I attended portions of last Friday's commission meeting. I also attended the commission meeting in Longmont. At the Longmont meeting I proposed that the current HART Intercivic system could not be salvaged and that a replacement was necessary. At last Friday's meeting, the flavor of the recommendation seemed to be to write a specification for printing paper ballots for use with the Hart system that would result in a satisfactory election process. It seems, to me, unlikely that such a specification can be written. First the history, as I see it: 1. The Hart system was ill-conceived. The approach did not appreciate the technical problems, nor did it meet all of the requirements of a sound election process. 2. The engineering was inadequate, both in the design and testing. 3. (I suspect) the procurement contract didn't hold Hart's feet to the fire. The result was the debacle of the 2004 Boulder County Elections. Hart blames the printer, etc. In the recent city election, a smaller ballot was used with better results. My conclusion: 1. The recent election does not prove that future elections will be better than the November 2004 election. The Hart system is very sensitive to the size of the paper ballot and an election with a complex ballot may again fail. The system is also sensitive to the quality of the printing but without Hart's cooperation, it is not possible to even identify the aspects of print quality affecting the tally accuracy, much less quantify them. The accuracy is also affected by temperature, humidity, and maybe even by the phase of the third moon of Neptune for all we know. The performance of the Hart System is also certain to degrade as components wear and deteriorate. Maintenance and repair may not restore the system to the original quality. Exact replacement components may not be available in the future; substitutes may further degrade the system. Running test ballots before the election does not tell you how close to the margins you are; a small change in environment can cause the system to crash. Good engineering practice requires that sufficient margins be incorporated in the design to allow for degraded performance. Then the design should be margin tested to assure that it will work in all circumstances. The November 2004 election results prove that was not done. That the recent election didn't crash doesn't mitigate that conclusion. Without Hart's cooperation, there is no way to know how close to the edge the system is for any particular election. It is almost certain to get worse in the future. 2. Hart's behavior suggest to me that they have given up on this product. As a business strategy they priced printing of ballots sufficiently high to force Boulder to go outside to procure the ballots. Since print quality affects the election results, Hart can claim the printing is the problem, not their system. Without their cooperation it is impossible to write a meaningful specification for the print quality. Since they have given up on Boulder, the can price maintenance and repair on this complex system as high as they wish. We loose; they win. SUMMARY: Hart wants this system to go away; so do I. Sincerely, Ivan C. Meek citizen activist
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V2.6 Requirements for the Voting Process.doc
Description: MS-Word document