Re: Write-In Ballots

[Paul E Condon <pecondon@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

I just googled 'VotePuncher' and got _no_ hits. Please give a
URL for this project's home page.

Paul C

On Sat, Apr 23, 2005 at 05:15:55PM -0500, Ivan C Meek wrote:
> Hi Paul,
> 
> Thanks for taking the time to respond.  I hope I can clear up any
> misunderstandings.
> 
> >Interesting Ivan - this is the first time that I have seen this message
> from >you. I'm not clear whom you mean by Linda and Mike.
> 
> I meant: Hillary Hall, Paul Tiger, Linda Flack, and Mike Taylor, the
> recipients of my message.  It was later sent to some interested election
> reformers.
> 
> >I enjoyed your ideas about continuing to use the DataVote system.
> >Many of us did.
> 
> Thank you.  However, I am not and have never advocated "continuing" or
> restarting "use the DataVote [sic] system."  The voting machine I briefly
> presented at the Longmont hearing was the "VotePuncher(TM)," a grassroots
> effort currently in the design phase.  While based on the Datavote design,
> it uses no components from the now obsolete Datavote nor will it require any
> support or even contact from Sequoia Pacific.  Sequoia's earlier
> intellectual property rights to the Datavote are now in the public domain.
> 
> >History shows that the county repeatedly repaired this system so it
> >could be used over the years.
> 
> Your comments suggests that the Datavote voting machine failed repeatedly.
> I do not believe this to be true.  In fact, I believe the Datavote is the
> most reliable voting machine ever made.  If you know of ANY case where the
> Datevote failed to accurately mark a ballot, please give me the details.  I
> know there were a few cases where the ballots were inaccurately printed,
> misleading voters.  I also know that the "tabulators," i.e., the optical
> scanners, frequently needed to be repaired after they had been used for
> decades.
> 
> The Datavote also suffered from voter procedural errors such as the failure
> of the voter to turn the ballot over to vote the backside.  The proposed
> VotePuncher does not have those shortcomings.
> 
> Again, if you know of ANY case where the Datevote failed to accurately mark
> a ballot, please give me the details.
> 
> >Now we've been federally mandated not to use it. HAVA and
> >state laws specifically disallow the use of ANY punch card
> >system. So we're stuck. It had to be replaced.
> 
> This is NOT true.  Here is the link to the actual HAVA (Help America Vote
> Act) document: www.fec.gov/hava/hava.htm  In fact, HAVA specifically ALLOWS
> punch card voting systems.
> 
> I have heard the rumor (from the SoS's office) that state laws disallow
> punch card systems.  I am skeptical based on the source.  Please send me the
> citation in the state law.  I would like to read it.
> 
> >There's lots not to like about this system, but one thing that can be done
> >with it is that it can be audited on-the-fly. There are not many systems
> >that can be audited in this way. So there is an advantage.
> 
> While there are several systems that can be "audited on-the-fly," it can not
> be done without damaging the integrity of the election process.  I hope it
> is not done.
> 
> >All of the ERC members have discussed open source. We'd like that very
> much.
> >But we're not going to get that from any vendor in the US, and we have no
> >ability to force the manufacturers to do that.
> 
> I am the spokesperson for The Democracy Technology Project, a grassroots
> effort unconnected to any voting machine company.  We are the originators
> and promoters of the VotePuncher system.  We will supply the software for
> our system, not a private company.  Source and object code and all related
> documents will be publicly posted.  However, the software in the VotePuncher
> is minuscule compared to a DRE.
> 
> More importantly, the software in the VotePuncher is only used to help a
> voter avoid a procedural error, such as under- or over-voting or to assist
> previously disadvantaged voters such as blind citizens, not to record or
> tally a vote.  THERE IS NO SOFTWARE OR HIDDEN ELECTRONICS BETWEEN THE
> VOTER'S HAND ON THE PUNCH HANDLE AND THE HOLE IN THE BALLOT!  After the
> polls close, the votes are to be publicly hand counted in the precinct and
> then passed through an optical scanner to verify the hand count.  Any
> discrepancies are to be resolved in the precinct by visually examining the
> ballots.  The whole process will take less than an hour even for complex
> elections.
> 
> >When I witnessed your presentation in Longmont, I couldn't help but to
> think
> >that you were addressing the wrong group. You should join Neal in his quest
> >to get NIST to listen.
> 
> The objective of NIST (I assume you are referring to Technical Guidelines
> Development Committee established by the Help America Vote Act) and of The
> Democracy Technology Project (and myself) are not the same.  I have attached
> our fifteen "Requirements for the Voting Process" that spell out our
> objectives.  The VotePuncher system meets all fifteen of them.  I know of no
> other voting system that does.
> 
> I do not envision attempting to "get NIST to listen."  I wish Neal luck.
> 
> I spoke to the commission for two reasons: 1) to state that the Hart system
> could not be salvaged, and 2) to dispel the notion that it was not possible
> to meet all of the HAVA requirements, be reasonably priced and maintain the
> integrity necessary for free, fair and transparent elections.
> 
> >If you've been paying any attention to what's going on in our state house,
> >then you'd know that there's lots of infighting to change very little.
> 
> I have been.
> 
> >Also, I believe you and many others have made assumptions about what we
> have
> >without either firsthand experience or listening to testimony.
> >But I would still agree with your summation. It's not likely that we'll get
> >much support from Hart given recent history.
> 
> There seems to be an implicit assumption that "firsthand experience or
> listening to testimony" are necessary to know what is going on.  You need to
> support that assumption.
> 
> >One thing that we can do is to modify the software ourselves. It is not as
> >closed as some of the open source advocates have imagined. We own the
> >software and the source. The question is if the county is willing to deal
> >directly with the systems and ignore threats from Hart concerning
> >non-support, which were not getting anyway.
> 
> As someone who has written software and managed projects involving software,
> I advise against it.  It is essentially impossible to write software for
> equipment that is a complete mystery and without the builder's support.
> 
> >To replace the system that we have (a nice thought) with
> >something less proprietary at this date in time seems highly unlikely.
> 
> Highly unlikely or not, Hart needs to be replaced.  A little perspective is
> needed here.  $1.3 million spent in Boulder is a lot of money.  So is the $3
> billion, or so, assigned to buy electronic voting machines nationally.  Both
> pale in comparison to the $300 billion, 1,500 American lives lost and tens
> of thousands of civilians killed in a war that would not have happened if
> the presidential election in 2000 had been determined by the majority of
> voting citizens and not by five unelected partisan political appointees.
> 
> Americans have long agreed that the billions of dollars and the lives lost
> are worth the expense to maintain our democracy.  (Yes, I served in the
> Armed Forces, not that that is relevant.)  The money spent on Hart and other
> electronic voting systems has damaged our democracy, not supported it.  This
> is not about what brand of police cars to buy or whether to remodel the
> courthouse.  Our democracy is at stake.  That democracy requires voting
> systems with integrity.
> 
> Respectfully,
> 
> -Ivan C. Meek
> 
> 
> 
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Paul Tiger - LPBC - Outreach [mailto:outreach@xxxxxxxxxxxxx]
> Sent: Thursday, April 21, 2005 1:29 PM
> To: Ivan C Meek
> Cc: cvv-discuss@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx; Goef Cahoon
> Subject: RE: Re: Write-In Ballots
> 
> 
> Interesting Ivan - this is the first time that I have seen this message from
> you. I'm not clear whom you mean by Linda and Mike.
> 
> I enjoyed your ideas about continuing to use the DataVote system. Many of us
> did. History shows that the county repeatedly repaired this system so it
> could be used over the years. Now we've been federally mandated not to use
> it. HAVA and state laws specifically disallow the use of ANY punch card
> system. So we're stuck. It had to be replaced.
> After much to do, the commissioners and clerk with a great deal of public
> input from a small group of activists, opted for a paper system. And that's
> what we have now.
> There's lots not to like about this system, but one thing that can be done
> with it is that it can be audited on-the-fly. There are not many systems
> that can be audited in this way. So there is an advantage.
> 
> All of the ERC members have discussed open source. We'd like that very much.
> But we're not going to get that from any vendor in the US, and we have no
> ability to force the manufacturers to do that.
> 
> When I witnessed your presentation in Longmont, I couldn't help but to think
> that you were addressing the wrong group. You should join Neal in his quest
> to get NIST to listen.
> 
> I'd go for the low-tech solution any day of the week. This system is what we
> have, and it can be improved. There are legal deadlines that must be met by
> our clerk. To replace the system that we have (a nice thought) with
> something less proprietary at this date in time seems highly unlikely. From
> what I can see of the elections calendar (the law); BC would have to get the
> legislature to retro-actively change the laws. If you've been paying any
> attention to what's going on in our state house, then you'd know that
> there's lots of infighting to change very little.
> Technology is not the only issue here. It is highly politicized, and in my
> honest opinion - pretty darn stupid.
> 
> Also, I believe you and many others have made assumptions about what we have
> without either firsthand experience or listening to testimony.
> But I would still agree with your summation. It's not likely that we'll get
> much support from Hart given recent history.
> 
> One thing that we can do is to modify the software ourselves. It is not as
> closed as some of the open source advocates have imagined. We own the
> software and the source. The question is if the county is willing to deal
> directly with the systems and ignore threats from Hart concerning
> non-support, which were not getting anyway.
> 
> Paul Tiger
> 
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Ivan C Meek [mailto:ivan.meek@xxxxxxxxx]
> Sent: Thursday, April 21, 2005 10:29 AM
> To: Robert Mcgrath
> Cc: attendees@xxxxxxx; Joe Pezzillo; cvv-discuss@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx; Goef
> Cahoon
> Subject: RE: Re: Write-In Ballots
> 
> Robert,
> 
> I believe the problems in Boulder County are greater than the ballot
> handling of paper ballots.  Here is the response I sent to some members of
> the Boulder Election Commission:
> 
> --------------------------Forwarded Message---------------------------------
> 
> Hillary, Paul, Linda, Mike,
> 
> I attended portions of last Friday's commission meeting.  I also attended
> the commission meeting in Longmont.  At the Longmont meeting I proposed that
> the current HART Intercivic system could not be salvaged and that a
> replacement was necessary.
> 
> At last Friday's meeting, the flavor of the recommendation seemed to be to
> write a specification for printing paper ballots for use with the Hart
> system that would result in a satisfactory election process.  It seems, to
> me, unlikely that such a specification can be written.
> 
> First the history, as I see it:
> 
> 1.  The Hart system was ill-conceived.  The approach did not appreciate the
> technical problems, nor did it meet all of the requirements of a sound
> election process.
> 
> 2.  The engineering was inadequate, both in the design and testing.
> 
> 3.  (I suspect) the procurement contract didn't hold Hart's feet to the
> fire.
> 
> The result was the debacle of the 2004 Boulder County Elections.  Hart
> blames the printer, etc.  In the recent city election, a smaller ballot was
> used with better results.
> 
> My conclusion:
> 
> 1.  The recent election does not prove that future elections will be better
> than the November 2004 election.  The Hart system is very sensitive to the
> size of the paper ballot and an election with a complex ballot may again
> fail.  The system is also sensitive to the quality of the printing but
> without Hart's cooperation, it is not possible to even identify the aspects
> of print quality affecting the tally accuracy, much less quantify them.  The
> accuracy is also affected by temperature, humidity, and maybe even by the
> phase of the third moon of Neptune for all we know.
> 
> The performance of the Hart System is also certain to degrade as components
> wear and deteriorate.  Maintenance and repair may not restore the system to
> the original quality.  Exact replacement components may not be available in
> the future; substitutes may further degrade the system.
> 
> Running test ballots before the election does not tell you how close to the
> margins you are; a small change in environment can cause the system to
> crash.  Good engineering practice requires that sufficient margins be
> incorporated in the design to allow for degraded performance.  Then the
> design should be margin tested to assure that it will work in all
> circumstances.  The November 2004 election results prove that was not done.
> That the recent election didn't crash doesn't mitigate that conclusion.
> Without Hart's cooperation, there is no way to know how close to the edge
> the system is for any particular election.  It is almost certain to get
> worse in the future.
> 
> 2.  Hart's behavior suggest to me that they have given up on this product.
> As a business strategy they priced printing of ballots sufficiently high to
> force Boulder to go outside to procure the ballots.  Since print quality
> affects the election results, Hart can claim the printing is the problem,
> not their system.  Without their cooperation it is impossible to write a
> meaningful specification for the print quality.  Since they have given up on
> Boulder, the can price maintenance and repair on this complex system as high
> as they wish.  We loose; they win.
> 
> SUMMARY:  Hart wants this system to go away; so do I.
> 
> Sincerely,
> 
> Ivan C. Meek
> citizen activist
> 



-- 
Paul E Condon           
pecondon@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx