3 points: Re: Hart InterCivic presentation materials up

[Bollinger <bolo@xxxxxxxxxxxx>]

1.  I'd proposed including this 2-D barcode on & adjacent to the printed
text receipt for each voter's record at the Hart presentation.  They implied
they could do it, but that this feature was not available currently.  I do
not see why this feature could not be requested in a purchase contract.

2.  I do not understand how a paper receipt "facilitates vote-buying."  The
paper receipt should be essentially the same as a paper ballot, once the
voter verifies it is accurate.

3.  I suggested & asked about providing the extra paper receipt copy for
each voter along with its serial number & barcode, but was told that the
(voter privacy?) law precluded doing that.  I agree that an extra identical
paper receipt for the voter would be helpful in better insuring reliability
in the process. This leaves the option of voters volunteering to help check
their receipt results against the official record, to indicate if tampering
was done.   Could the committee request to have this feature and petition to
substantiate its legality, (or request legislation to enable it)?

JCBollinger   303-666-7422

----- Original Message ----- 
From: "Paul Walmsley" <paul@xxxxxxxxxxx>
To: "Paul Tiger" <tigerp@xxxxxxxxx>
Cc: <bcv@xxxxxxxxxxx>
Sent: Wednesday, October 22, 2003 12:06 AM
Subject: RE: Hart InterCivic presentation materials up


> On Tue, 21 Oct 2003, Paul Tiger wrote:
>
> > The thing that both Al and Kell have been making me see so clearly is
the
> > need for the voter verifiable ballot. Maybe you'd be shocked to know
that I
> > think that voters should be able to keep a copy of their ballots? Yeah,
I
> > can't see what all the secrecy is about. Its my vote and I should be
able to
> > tell anyone that I want to.
>
> seems like it's worth distinguishing between paper receipts and paper
> ballots.  the difference (to my mind) being that you can take paper
> receipts home with you, they are not available for counting; whereas paper
> ballots are deposited at the precinct and are used either (A) as the
> official record of your vote, or (B) as a backup record of your vote, for
> recounts and for voting machine validation tests.
>
> I don't think that paper receipts are very useful; they also facilitate
> vote-buying, as one of the vendor representatives pointed out.  On the
> other hand, the generation of voter-verifiable paper ballots makes sense,
> since it works around many verifiability problems which seem inherent to
> DRE machines.
>
> > Can anyone here tell me if Hart was able to demonstrate a method to use
> > their DREs to produce a paper ballot?
>
> Hart showed two devices that generated paper ballots.
>
> The first device was familiar: a voting terminal (the "eSlate") with an
> thermal printer attached.  This device generated a plain-text confirmation
> of your vote, which would scroll onto an enclosed takeup reel once the
> vote was confirmed.  I do not recall whether this printout incorporated a
> 2-D bar code or not.  Hart actually demonstrated this device in operation.
>
> The second device shown was a standalone thermal printer in a voting
> booth-style privacy shield.  Next to it sat a laptop computer with a
> barcode scanner attached.  Voters who wish to confirm their votes on paper
> would proceed to this device after voting on an eSlate.  The standalone
> printer would generate a 2-D bar code -- without printing plaintext --
> which could be scanned by the bar code reader to confirm the voter's
> intent.  If the voter accepted the ballot, they could press the "Accept"
> button on top of the printer, which would then scroll the barcode onto the
> enclosed takeup reel.  Otherwise, they could press the "Reject" button, at
> which point the barcode would be annotated with some sort of rejection
> code and scrolled onto the takeup reel.  The voter would then return to
> the election judge to vote again.  Hart did not demonstrate this device in
> operation - it was an 'engineering prototype.'
>
>
>
> - Paul
>
>